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  INTRODUCTION   
We tend to think about how companies threaten individual 
privacy by examining their data-handling policies at frozen 
moments in time. At a given moment, so the typical reasoning 
goes, a company may collect too much information about its us-
ers, enabling it to compile rich digital dossiers.1 It may do too 
little to protect this information, exposing secrets to hackers 
and unscrupulous employees.2 It may store information for a 
much longer time than it has a need to keep it.3
 
 1. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1–10 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PER-
SON]. 
 
 2. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public 
and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 
251–55 (2007). 
 3. Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Dis-
couraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 191, 209–15 (2011) (summarizing data retention policies for web-
sites, Internet providers, and telecommunications companies). 
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This Article reconsiders problems like these within a more 
dynamic framework, putting frozen moments of time into mo-
tion and shifting the focus to the topic of change. What happens 
when companies rewrite long-established ground rules govern-
ing the way they handle data about their users? There is value 
in studying as a distinct privacy problem the sudden privacy 
shift, which some have called the “privacy lurch.”4
This is a timely subject for study, as significant new priva-
cy lurches have become an increasingly common phenomenon. 
In March 2012, Google tore down the walls that once separated 
databases tracking user behavior across its services, letting it 
correlate for the first time, for example, a user’s calendar ap-
pointments with her search queries.
 Users who 
experience privacy lurches find themselves exposed to distinct 
harms that policymakers can counter with tailored remedies, 
solutions which are easy to miss when change is not in focus.  
5 In 2008, broadband cable 
Internet providers began testing systems that would have al-
lowed them to watch their users’ web surfing habits much more 
than they had in the past, in order to sell targeted advertising.6 
Over the past few years, Facebook has incrementally shifted its 
default settings from providing robust privacy to allowing pub-
lic scrutiny of its users’ personal information.7
Privacy lurches like these disrupt long-settled expecta-
tions. They foist new ground rules upon millions of users whose 
attention spans have long since waned.
 
8
 
 4. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1200–
01 (2009). 
 Lurches give lie to the 
model of the informed user and contradict company claims of 
meaningful user consent premised on far-fetched theories of the 
evolving nature of online contracts. They expose to great harm 
individuals who do not understand the way that the infor-
mation collected about them has been put to new, invasive us-
 5. Alma Whitten, Updating Our Privacy Policies and Terms of Service, 
GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/ 
01/updating-our-privacy-policies-and-terms.html. 
 6. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1432–38 [hereinafter Ohm, Rise and Fall]. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 8. See Rob Weatherhead, Say It Quick, Say It Well—The Attention Span 
of a Modern Internet User, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2012, 3:52 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media-network/media-networkblog/2012/mar/19/ 
attention-span-internet-consumer (describing the distractibility of the average 
Internet user). 
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es.9 They deprive their users the free choice to decide whether 
the value of a service justifies the tradeoff to personal privacy, 
particularly when the user feels locked in to a specific provider 
because of the time and energy he has already invested (think 
social networks) or the lack of meaningful competition (think 
broadband Internet service or Internet search).10
But despite the many problems with privacy lurches, some 
might argue we should do nothing to limit them. Privacy lurch-
es are products of a dynamic marketplace for online goods and 
services.
 
11 What I call a lurch, the media instead tends to my-
thologize as a “pivot,” a shift in a company’s business model 
celebrated as proof of the nimble, entrepreneurial dynamism 
that has become a hallmark of our information economy.12
To help balance the advantages of the dynamic market-
place with the harms of privacy lurches, this Article prescribes 
a new twist on old notice-and-choice solutions. This is admit-
tedly an out-of-fashion approach to information privacy, as 
many have lost faith in notice-and-choice.
 Be-
fore we intervene against the harms of privacy lurches, we need 
to consider what we might give up in return.  
13
 
 9. Cory Doctorow, The Curious Case of Internet Privacy, TECH. REV. 
(June 6, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428045/the-curious 
-case-of-internet-privacy/. 
 Scholars have de-
scribed how notice suffers, particularly on the web, from fun-
damental information-quality problems; we are awash in a sea 
of lengthy privacy policies that we cannot take the time to read, 
 10. See Woodrow Hartzog, Web Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
1635, 1650–53 (2011) (explaining the inadequacy of online privacy policies for 
eliciting consent). 
 11. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCI-
PLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 40 (2009) [hereinafter FTC, 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/ 
02/P085400behavadreport.pdf (“[A] business may have a legitimate need to 
change its privacy policy from time to time, especially in the dynamic online 
marketplace.”). 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the 
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1392–402 (2000) (critiquing argu-
ments for privacy as choice); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 821–28 (2000) (critiquing arguments for privacy as con-
trol); see also N.Y. Times Editors, An Interview with David Vladeck of the 
F.T.C., MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Aug. 5, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://mediadecoder 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/an-interview-with-david-vladeck-of-the-ftc/ (de-
scribing the search for a new framework for protecting privacy beyond notice-
and-choice by the new head of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection). 
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written by sophisticated parties with an incentive to hide the 
worst parts.14
To breathe a little life back into notice-and-choice, this Ar-
ticle looks to brands and trademarks, representing a novel in-
tegration of two very important but until now rarely connected 
areas of information policy.
 
15 Trademark laws recognize how 
certain words and symbols in the marketplace tackle the very 
same information quality and consumer protection concerns 
that animate notice-and-choice debates in privacy law. Scholars 
who study marketing, branding, and trademark theory describe 
the unique informational power of trademarks, service marks, 
and, more generally, brands to signal quality and goodwill to 
consumers concisely and unambiguously.16 Trademark scholars 
describe how brands can serve to punish and warn, helping 
consumers recognize a company with a track record of shoddy 
practices or weak attention to consumer protection.17
This Article proposes that we use the information qualities 
of trademarks to meet the notice deficiencies of privacy law. It 
recommends that lawmakers and regulators force almost every 
company that handles customer information to bind its brand 
 
 
 14. E.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral 
Economics Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOL-
OGIES, AND PRACTICES 363, 363–64 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008); M. 
Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1050–55 (2012). 
 15. Scholars have compared online privacy to different aspects of the 
broader field of unfair competition law, within which trademark law is situat-
ed. Many, for example, have written about the common law right of publicity, 
which straddles the two areas. See generally, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the 
Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341 (2011). Others have noted how 
particular trademark or unfair competition remedies may impinge on personal 
privacy or vice versa. See generally, e.g., Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Enforcing In-
tellectual Property Rights by Diminishing Privacy: How the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Jeopardizes the Right to Privacy, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 601 (2011). Still others have looked at particular developments 
that have put pressure on both trademark and privacy law. See generally, e.g., 
William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Market-
ing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105; James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search 
Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007). But none of these articles analyzes the 
ways in which the theoretical underpinnings of trademark law can be used as 
a tool to correct the fundamental flaws in notice-and-choice solutions, the most 
prominent tools used to ensure privacy.  
 16. See generally Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004). 
 17. See generally Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845 (2003). 
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name to a fully specified set of core privacy commitments.18
Although this “branded privacy” solution is novel, it is well-
supported by the theoretical underpinnings of both privacy law 
and trademark law. It builds on the work of privacy scholars 
who have looked to consumer protection law for guidance.
 The 
name “Facebook,” for example, should be inextricably bound to 
that company’s specific, fundamental promises about the 
amount of information it collects and the uses to which it puts 
that information. If the company chooses someday to depart 
from these initial core privacy commitments, it must choose a 
new name to describe its modified service, albeit perhaps one 
associated with the old name, such as “Facebook Plus” or “Face-
book Enhanced.” 
19 
Just as companies selling inherently dangerous products are 
obligated to attach warning labels,20 so too should companies 
shifting privacy practices in inherently dangerous, expectation-
defeating ways be required to warn their customers.21
Branded privacy finds little direct support from traditional 
trademark theory, which focuses almost exclusively on the 
source-identifying role of trademarks, but it is well supported 
by other aspects of trademark theory and doctrine, which em-
phasize the connection between trademarks and quality con-
trol. It finds even stronger support from the recent work of a 
group of scholars—who have never before been identified as a 
separate scholarly “movement,” and whom I am giving the 
moniker “the New Trademark” scholars—who reconceptualize 
trademarks as swords used on behalf of consumers rather than 
merely as shields used to defend producers.
 And the 
spot at the top of every Internet web page displaying the brand 
name may be the best available space for an effective warning 
label online.  
22
At the same time, this solution strikes a balance between 
the positive aspects of dynamism and the negative harms of 
 
 
 18. “Almost” because a few carve outs are recommended for very new 
companies still actively experimenting with business models. See infra Part 
III.E.  
 19. See generally James Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 
WIDENER L.J. 793 (2010) (discussing product safety laws and privacy in social 
media). 
 20. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 21. See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1202 (“That unannounced design 
change made both Facebook and its partner sites unreasonably dangerous 
services.”). 
 22. See infra Part III.A.2.c. 
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privacy lurches. It leaves room for market actors to innovate by 
focusing on fixing information-quality problems during privacy 
lurches rather than prohibiting them outright, and by restrict-
ing mandatory rebranding only to situations involving a narrow 
class of privacy promises. Companies will be free to evolve and 
adapt their practices in any way that does not tread upon their 
core privacy commitments, but they could abandon a core com-
mitment only by changing their brand. This rule will act like a 
brake, forcing companies to stop and consider the class of 
choices consumers care about most, without preventing dyna-
mism unrelated to those choices. And when companies do 
choose to modify a core privacy commitment, their new brands 
will send clear, unambiguous signals to consumers and privacy 
watchdogs that something important has changed. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the 
problem with privacy lurches, giving examples of recent lurches 
and elaborating the special harms (and risks of harm) that pri-
vacy lurches cause. Part II outlines what must be done to deal 
with the problem of privacy lurches, identifying the shortcom-
ings of solutions proposed by others, and embracing notice-and-
choice solutions that improve the information-quality problems 
that plague most alternatives. Part II then shows how trade-
mark and brand theories have addressed very similar infor-
mation-quality problems. Finally, Part III develops the branded 
privacy solution, explains its virtues, offers variations to 
strengthen or weaken its effects as situations demand, discuss-
es what legal reforms are needed to implement the idea, and 
responds to anticipated critiques. 
I.  PIVOTS AND PRIVACY LURCHES   
A. THE PIVOT 
Consider the “pivot.” Although the word and the idea prob-
ably pre-date the use by entrepreneur Eric Ries, they are most 
often said to have been popularized with him, his blog,23 and 
his book, The Lean Startup.24
 
 23. Eric Ries, STARTUP LESSONS LEARNED BLOG, http://www 
.startuplessonslearned.com/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).  
 Ries defines a pivot as “the idea 
that successful startups change directions but stay grounded in 
 24. ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP (2011). 
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what they’ve learned.”25 Pivots have happened for as long as we 
have had companies, but both their incidence and their im-
portance have increased as business models shift to the Inter-
net, which itself changes so quickly as to obsolete business 
models before a company gets off the ground.26
Pivots have become part of a new dynamic marketplace for 
online services. In this new world, a start-up that fails brings 
no shame to its founders and investors, so long as it “fail[s] 
gracefully.”
 
27 Ries himself argues that “[f]ailure is a prerequi-
site to learning.”28 Software pioneer Mitch Kapor estimates that 
“roughly 15 to 20 percent”29 of the companies he funds through 
his start-up investment fund “have gone through radical trans-
formations.”30
In fact, the pivot has been valorized as a sign that founders 
are trying to harness the engine of creative destruction.
 
31 Many 
bloggers and writers in the trade press recite with great admi-
ration the now-enormous companies that once pivoted: Flickr 
“started out as a feature of an online game”32 and PayPal “was 
focused on the idea of beaming money between hand-held digi-
tal assistants.”33 The customer-facing music recommendation 
service Pandora started as a service aimed at businesses like 
AOL and Yahoo!.34
Pivots are seen as a continuation of the dot-com-boom-era 
maxim that sophisticated investors invest in people and not 
their ideas.
 
35
 
 25. Eric Ries, Pivot, Don’t Jump to a New Vision, STARTUP LESSONS 
LEARNED BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://www.startuplessonslearned.com/2009/ 
06/pivot-dont-jump-to-new-vision.html. 
 The difference today, according to pivot propo-
 26. Jenna Wortham, In Tech, Starting Up by Failing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 
2012, at B1. 
 27. Id.; Steve Lohr, With a Leaner Model, Start-Ups Reach Further Afield, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at D3. 
 28. RIES, supra note 24, at 154. 
 29. Wortham, supra note 26, at B6. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
81–86 (1942).  
 32. Wortham, supra note 26, at B6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Tom Grasty, The Difference Between a ‘Pivot’ and a ‘Reboot’, IDEA LAB 
BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/idealab/2012/02/the-difference 
-between-a-pivot-and-a-reboot048.html. 
 35. Investing in Start-ups: The Pivotal Moment, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2010, 
at 84. 
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nents, is the falling cost of starting an online business.36 This 
has given rise to “a remarkable increase in the degree of entre-
preneurial experimentation.”37
As a key component of the success of tech startups in Sili-
con Valley, the pivot thus becomes a central part of the opera-
tion of our entire economy. The Obama Administration touts 
entrepreneurs whenever it discusses its agenda for strengthen-
ing the economy and creating jobs.
  
38 The administration 
launched a broad initiative it calls “Startup America,” intended 
to “celebrate, inspire, and accelerate high-growth entrepre-
neurship throughout the nation.”39 In the just-completed elec-
tion cycle, Republican candidates who sought to replace the 
President talked a lot about start-up entrepreneurship on the 
campaign trail.40
B. PRIVACY LURCHES 
 Pivots fuel entrepreneurship, which seems to 
be the only engine of the economy that still functions properly. 
Who could possibly say anything bad about them? 
But nimble pivots and corporate dynamism can also harm 
individual privacy. Companies that pivot after amassing large 
databases full of information about individual users too often 
choose to use the information in new ways, reneging on express 
and implied promises made when those users first signed up. 
Often these pivots fit under the subcategory of “monetization” 
strategies, a dressed-up way to describe methods for converting 
user secrets into cash.41
 
 36. Id. 
 These “privacy lurches” can be deeply 
disruptive to settled expectations and often leave users feeling 
 37. Id. (quoting Bill Sahlman of Harvard Business School). 
 38. Fact Sheet: White House Launches “Startup America” Initiative, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2012). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Mitt Romney, Former Mass. Governor, Florida Republican Prima-
ry Speech (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
election-2012/post/mitt-romneys-florida-republican-primary-speech-full-text/ 
2012/01/31/gIQA8tYKgQ_blog.html (“My vision for free enterprise is to return 
entrepreneurship to the genius and creativity of the American people . . . . I 
will make America the most attractive place in the world for entrepreneurs, 
for innovators, and for job creators.”). 
 41. Martin Zwilling, Top 10 Ways Entrepreneurs Pivot a Lean Startup, 
FORBES (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
martinzwilling/2011/09/16/top-10-ways-entrepreneurs-pivot-a-lean-startup/ 
(listing ten types of pivots including, at number seven, the “value capture piv-
ot,” referring to the “monetization or revenue model”). 
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trapped between bad choices: tolerate significantly less privacy 
or abandon a service in which they have invested time, energy, 
and social effort. Privacy lurches are significant and special 
privacy problems that deserve tailored solutions, described fur-
ther below. But first, consider three prominent recent exam-
ples.  
1. Google’s 2012 Privacy Policy Transformation 
In January 2012, Google announced it was making signifi-
cant changes to its many privacy policies.42 Most importantly, it 
consolidated most of the “more than 70” privacy policies it had 
previously scattered across its various products into a single, 
omnibus privacy policy.43
The announcement inspired a deluge of commentary, much 
of it critical
 
44 but some supportive.45 Many observers focused on 
the most important substantive shift announced, that Google 
would begin combining data about its users across services that 
historically it had kept separate.46 The company described this 
change as a boon for users, praising “the cool things Google can 
do when we combine information across products.”47 As an ex-
ample, it crowed that “[w]e can provide reminders that you’re 
going to be late for a meeting based on your location, your cal-
endar and an understanding of what the traffic is like that day. 
Or ensure that our spelling suggestions, even for your friends’ 
names, are accurate because you’ve typed them before.”48
Some were less enthused. The Center for Digital Democra-
cy charged Google with “a failure to be candid with users,”
 
49
 
 42. Whitten, supra note 
 
and for violating a consent decree it had entered into with the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2011 promising reformed 
5. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Jon Brodkin, Google Privacy Change Taking Effect Today Is Illegal, 
EU Officials Say, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 1, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://arstechnica 
.com/tech-policy/2012/03/google-privacy-change-taking-effect-today-is-illegal 
-eu-officials-say/ (summarizing concerns by regulators and privacy activists). 
 45. Matt Rosoff, The Panic over Google’s New Privacy Rules Is Ridiculous, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 25, 2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the 
-panic-over-googles-new-privacy-rules-is-ridiculous-2012-1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Whitten, supra note 5. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Demedia, FTC Should Halt Google Privacy Changes, as Violation of 
Consent Decree, CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.democraticmedia.org/ftc-should-halt-google-privacy-changes 
-violation-consent-decree. 
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privacy practices.50 Similarly, the Electronic Privacy Infor-
mation Center (EPIC) sued the FTC in federal court to compel 
the agency to block the consolidation of user data, accusing the 
FTC of “placing the privacy interests of literally hundreds of 
millions [of] Internet users at grave risk” by failing to act.51 A 
judge dismissed the suit as an attack on a non-reviewable 
agency action, but only after expressing the opinion that the 
complaint “advanced serious concerns that may well be legiti-
mate.”52
Regulators expressed similar concerns. Eight members of 
the House of Representatives sent Google executives a request 
for more information.
 
53 One of the most vocal was Representa-
tive Ed Markey, who released a statement complaining that 
“[s]haring users’ personal information across its products may 
make good business sense for Google, but it undermines priva-
cy safeguards for consumers.”54 State officials, through the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General, sent a letter focusing 
on the lack of an opportunity to opt out of the pooling of data.55
European regulators concurred. Several national data-
protection authorities from countries across Europe asked 
Google to delay implementing its planned changes.
 
56 At the 
same time, they asked one of their ranks, the French regulator 
CNIL, to open an investigation into the shift.57
 
 50. Id. 
 
 51. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 3, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FTC, 
2012 WL 413966 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-00206). 
 52. Memorandum Opinion at 11, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FTC (D.D.C. 
Feb. 24, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-00206), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/ 
cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2012cv0206-12.  
 53. Letter from Congressman Ed Markey et al. to Larry Page, Chief Exec. 
Officer, Google (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://markey.house.gov/sites/ 
markey.house.gov/files/documents/2012_0126.Google%20Prviacy%20Letter. 
pdf. 
 54. Katy Bachman, Pols to Google: Wrong Answers, ADWEEK (Jan. 31, 
2012), available at http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/pols-google 
-wrong-answers-137911.  
 55. Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., Attorneys General Express Concerns 
over Google’s Privacy Policy, NAAG NEWS BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www 
.naag.org/attorneys-general-express-concerns-over-googles-privacy-policy 
-attorneys-general-express-concerns-over-googles-privacy-policy.php. 
 56. James Kanter, E.U. Presses Google to Delay Privacy Policy Changes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at B3. 
 57. Id. 
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2. NebuAd and Phorm 
Telephone and cable television companies launched broad-
band Internet service at the end of the 1990s, utilizing a fee-
for-access business model, charging subscribers a monthly fee 
to be connected to all online services.58 This business model 
gave the broadband providers no incentive to intrude into sub-
scriber privacy, and they restricted their scrutiny of customer 
behavior to limited circumstances involving the protection of 
the security of their networks.59
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, several 
competitive and technological shifts altered these incentives. 
Broadband providers found themselves under constant pres-
sure to improve their infrastructure in order to deliver greater 
bandwidth, to keep up with data-hungry applications like 
streaming video and voice telephony.
 
60 They also eyed jealously 
Google’s ascension, which was based almost entirely on sales of 
advertising tied contextually to a user’s online behavior.61 In 
2008, start-up companies began approaching the broadband 
providers promising new technologies they could use to com-
pete with Google’s ability to trade user secrets for cash.62
Two companies in particular, NebuAd and Phorm, began to 
market very similar services.
 
63 They asked providers to install 
systems that would peer, at least a little, into the web surfing 
habits of their subscribers, allowing them to build profiles of 
each subscriber’s online activities, using so-called deep-packet 
inspection technology.64 The NebuAd and Phorm systems would 
know, for example, that subscriber A frequented travel web-
sites while subscriber B bought shoes online.65 These profiles 
could then be sold to advertisers, who would deliver ads direct-
ly to a user’s desktop, again using NebuAd and Phorm technol-
ogies.66
 
 58. Internet Service Provider (ISP)–History and Development, FREE EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF ECOMMERCE, http://ecommerce.hostip.info/pages/623/Internet 
-Service-Provider-ISP-HISTORY-DEVELOPMENT.html (last visited Nov. 28, 
2012); see also Ohm, Rise and Fall supra note 
 
6, at 1429–30 (describing the 
dawn of the commercial Internet). 
 59. See Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1425–28. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1426. 
 62. See id. at 1432–35. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
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Phorm focused most of its attention on providers in the 
United Kingdom, while NebuAd concentrated on the U.S. mar-
ket, but in both countries, the responses were the same: fear, 
outrage, and regulatory scrutiny.67 The UK’s Information 
Commissioner strongly hinted that Phorm should offer the ser-
vice only on an opt-in basis.68 U.S. congressmen held numerous 
hearings and wrote letters to broadband providers (mostly ca-
ble operators) who had entered into contracts with NebuAd.69 
State Attorneys General conducted parallel investigations.70 In 
the end, NebuAd’s and Phorm’s provider partners began to 
abandon them. Today, NebuAd no longer exists, and Phorm has 
shifted its focus to other countries, including Brazil and Chi-
na.71
3. A Slow-Moving Lurch: Facebook’s Shift from Private to 
Public 
 
The hallmark of the lurches described so far is the sudden-
ness of the large shift. In every case, a long-established incum-
bent player with millions of customers (and in almost every ex-
ample, with a significant market share) instituted a dramatic 
change in the way it handled user information, virtually over-
night. Another very important privacy lurch has happened 
much more slowly, although for that reason calling it a lurch 
does some violence to language. Facebook has steadily, slowly 
transformed itself from a very private social network into a 
nearly public one. 
Although we can measure where Facebook falls along a 
continuum of private to public in many ways, using many met-
rics, consider one especially important measure: the degree of 
 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id.; see also Nate Anderson, Congress Goes After NebuAd . . . 
Again, ARS TECHNICA (July 15, 2008, 10:49 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech 
-policy/2008/07/congress-goes-after-nebuad-again/; Nate Anderson, NebuAd 
Mess Leads Big ISPs to Call for “Opt-in” Ad Targeting, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 
25, 2008, 8:54 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy-2008/09/nebuad-mess 
-leads-big-isps-to-call-for-opt-in-ad-targeting/. 
 70. See Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1435 (referencing the action 
of the Connecticut Attorney General). 
 71. See Wendy Davis, Case Closed: NebuAd Shuts Down, MEDIAPOST 
PUBLICATIONS (May 18, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/ 
publications/article/106277/; Glyn Moody, Phorm Still Looking for a Large 
-Scale Deployment, Still Finding Investors, TECHDIRT (Nov. 4, 2011, 2:42 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111103/10133616623/phorm-still-looking 
-large-scale-deployment-still-finding-investors.shtml. 
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accessibility of the facts that Facebook users submit to people 
other than “Friends” and “Friends of Friends.” In other words, 
how much can Facebook user A, who is not part of Facebook 
user B’s extended social network, know about B? And even 
more importantly, how much can a non-Facebook user know 
about people using Facebook? 
As anybody who has seen the movie knows, Facebook be-
gan as an exclusive service.72 Only college students at certain 
elite colleges were given access to the network, and people on 
the outside had almost no visibility to what was happening in-
side.73 But over time, Facebook has tried to invert itself, switch-
ing from a mostly private to a mostly public service.74 Consider 
the information found on the Facebook profile page—picture, 
gender, city, personal interests. In the beginning, none of this 
information was available outside the network by default.75 
Most importantly, this meant that Google’s search engine spi-
der could not harvest information about Facebook users, mean-
ing search queries for names never returned Facebook results.76
In July 2009, perhaps to compete with Twitter, a service 
that has been intrinsically public from birth,
 
77 Facebook flipped 
the default, making what the company called “Basic Info”—
photo, gender, hometown, current city, and biography—for the 
first time visible to the world at large.78 Users could opt out of 
sharing some pieces of basic info, by navigating Facebook’s fa-
mously complex privacy settings. But many fields—including 
name, picture, city, gender, networks, and fan pages—were no 
longer subject to hiding.79
 
 72. THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010). 
 
 73. See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www 
.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Chad Skelton, New Facebook Privacy Settings Make Your Private Pho-
tos Public, VANCOUVER SUN (Dec. 10, 2009, 8:59 AM), http://communities 
.canada.com/vancouversun/blogs/parenting/archive/2009/12/10/facebook-
privacy-settings-profile.aspx (speculating changes were made to compete with 
Twitter); see also Erick Schonfeld, Facebook’s Response to Twitter, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 4, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/04/facebooks 
-response-to-twitter/.  
 78. See Chris Kelly, Improving Sharing Through Control, Simplicity and 
Connection, FACEBOOK BLOG (July 1, 2009, 1:11 PM), https://blog 
.facebook.com/blog.php?post=101470352130. 
 79. Kevin Bankston, Facebook’s New Privacy Changes: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009), 
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Pulling back the lens a bit, the major shift in 2009 consti-
tuted but a single step in a much longer series transforming 
Facebook from a private to a public service. Facebook has in-
stantiated its policies in software but revealed them in its writ-
ten privacy policies, allowing commentators to mark their evo-
lution. Kurt Opsahl of the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
summarized this trend in a blog post, comparing six successive 
versions of the document.80 In 2005, the privacy policy promised 
that: “No personal information that you submit to Thefacebook 
will be available to any user of the Web Site who does not be-
long to at least one of the groups specified by you in your priva-
cy settings.”81 By 2007, this had shifted to: “Your name, school 
name, and profile picture thumbnail will be available in search 
results across the Facebook network unless you alter your pri-
vacy settings.”82 And by 2009, this had shifted yet again to: 
“Certain categories of information such as your name, profile 
photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender, geo-
graphic region, and networks you belong to are considered pub-
licly available to everyone, including Facebook-enhanced appli-
cations, and therefore do not have privacy settings.”83
Perceiving Facebook’s fundamental privacy lurch requires 
one to take a longer temporal view. At each step, Facebook ex-
posed to public view a little more information from a user’s pro-
file page than it had before.
 
84
As in the other examples, Facebook’s privacy lurch was 
criticized by consumers and privacy watchdogs and investigat-
ed by regulators. In 2011, the FTC filed charges against the 
company.
 Taken individually, these steps 
might seem like small shifts to the status quo, but when viewed 
across a still-relatively-compact set of five years, the radical 
sum shift is unmistakable. 
85
 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-changes-good 
-bad-and-ugly. 
 The two parties settled the charges late in 2011 
 80. Opsahl, supra note 73. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. For a fine visualization of Facebook’s slow transformation from pri-
vate to public, see Matt McKeon, The Evolution of Privacy on Facebook, 
MATTMCKEON.COM, http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/ (last updated 
May 19, 2010) (depicting Facebook’s changing privacy default settings in 
infographic).  
 85. Facebook, Inc., No. 0923184 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011) (Complaint). 
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with a consent settlement that binds Facebook to enhanced 
scrutiny of privacy practices for twenty years.86
It would be charitable for us to assume that Facebook’s 
privacy lurch was spurred by dynamic pressures from competi-
tors rather than as a cynical ploy to bait-and-switch new users. 
But we should worry that it might instead be the latter and 
thus represent an intentional, emerging new business strategy: 
companies may use privacy lurches strategically to take ad-
vantage of the lock-in and even natural monopoly tendencies of 
services like search engines and social networks.
 
87
C. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVACY LURCHES 
 The strategy 
works like this: create an online service with robust privacy 
practices, which will help lure people in. Once these people 
(now the service’s users) have invested their time, energy, and 
social capital in the service and begin to feel the lock-in effects 
of networks and familiarity, the service pivots, shifting toward 
looser privacy policies that provide better profit-making oppor-
tunities. The users, with their privacy expectations dashed, will 
have no way to leave. 
Most privacy experts weigh the impact of a privacy lurch 
by assessing only the end result. In this way, they treat a lurch 
no differently from the way they treat a brand new practice. 
Thus, Facebook’s decision to expose more information about its 
users to the general public should be assessed in precisely the 
same way we would assess a brand new social networking ser-
vice that had made the same privacy choices. But we miss 
something important if we treat a privacy lurch as no more 
than its end state. 
Privacy lurches give rise to two distinct sets of privacy 
harms, which I will call static and dynamic. The traditional ap-
proach to privacy analysis focuses solely on the static harms—
those that stem from a company’s new information handling 
procedures. Consider the static harms resulting from two of the 
scenarios presented above: when Google knocked down the 
walls that had once separated databases, it created much more 
 
 86. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges 
That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 
2011), http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm [hereinafter FTC 
Press Release]. 
 87. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Ac-
cess, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1149, 1182 (2008) (stating that users, especially those who use personal-
ized search, can become locked in with a specific search provider). 
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than a sum of the parts, revealing through the combination 
sensitive new bits of information that its users had consciously 
held back.88
For the past decade, information privacy theorists have 
been developing taxonomies and theories to describe privacy 
harms like these. None is as rich or complete as Daniel Solove’s 
taxonomy, which breaks privacy harm into four categories—
information collection, processing, dissemination, and inva-
sions—further subdivided into sixteen subcategories.
 When Facebook exposed once-private information 
about its users to the general public and to Google’s indexing 
spiders, it released embarrassing information (or worse) to 
stalkers, harassers, ex-spouses, potential employers, and more. 
89 The 
static harms that result from a privacy lurch are no different 
than the harms that would have resulted had the company em-
braced the practices from the outset, which means that they 
may fall within every part of Solove’s taxonomy. Google’s deci-
sion to break down the walls between databases risks raising 
the harms of, at least, Solove’s subcategories of surveillance, 
aggregation, identification, secondary use, exclusion, breach of 
confidentiality, disclosure, increased accessibility, and distor-
tion.90
It is helpful to focus on the static harms resulting from a 
lurch, because they can be compared to the industry status quo. 
Facebook’s shift from private to public can and should be com-
pared to the practices of other social networking sites, such as 
Twitter, which has been public from birth. 
 Facebook’s shift from private to public triggers the possi-
bility of many of these same harms. 
But this Article sheds light on the special problems of dy-
namism and change, problems that reflect not only the new da-
ta handling policies governing data about users, but harms that 
arise from the change itself. These are the harms felt by those 
who have their expectations of privacy dashed.91
 
 88. See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 
 Sometimes, 
1, at 1–10 (discussing 
digital dossiers of data and the resulting privacy implications); Paul Ohm, 
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1746–48 (2010) [hereinafter Ohm, 
Broken Promises] (describing how for privacy, aggregated data is often more 
than the sum of its parts). 
 89. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 101–06 (2008) 
[hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY]. 
 90. Id. at 104–05. 
 91. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLO-
GY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010) (describing breaches of 
norms of information flow). 
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these people experience what might feel like new, independent 
harms. More often, a privacy lurch accentuates or magnifies 
the static harms they feel. These dynamic harms can be more 
disruptive and harmful than the static harms alone. 
Change can be deeply unsettling. Human beings prefer 
predictability and stability, and abrupt change upsets those de-
sires. Solove has noted these psychological effects, describing 
how the “secondary use” of information “generates fear and un-
certainty” and “creat[es] a sense of powerlessness and vulnera-
bility.”92 Helen Nissenbaum describes the “unpleasant jolt” 
people experience when they are forced into a “clash of con-
texts.”93 We experience unexpected shifts as “nasty surprises of 
discovery.”94
Rapid change causes harm by disrupting settled expecta-
tions. This exacerbates the psychological impact, causing feel-
ings of “betrayal.”
 
95 This betrayal may even extend beyond the 
psychological and into an actual breach of contract if the 
change calls into question the validity of a binding promise be-
tween the user and the service.96 When companies lurch, indi-
vidual consumers can be made to feel as if they no longer have 
what they initially bought.97 When instability becomes the 
norm, people may lose trust in the companies selling services or 
even entire industries.98 Some lurches cause information to flow 
to friends or family in unintended ways, disrupting our most 
important social connections.99
 
 92. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 
 
89, at 132. 
 93. NISSENBAUM, supra note 91, at 225–26. 
 94. Id. 
 95. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 131. 
 96. See, e.g., Hartzog, supra note 10, at 1650–62. 
 97. See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1169 (“If you—like most people—
formed your privacy expectations around the way the site originally worked, 
they ceased being valid when the site changed.”). 
 98. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMER-
CIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 1 (2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/2010/december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf (explain-
ing that privacy “harms . . . undermine consumer trust in the Internet envi-
ronment” which “may cause consumers to hesitate before adopting new ser-
vices and impede innovative and productive uses of new technologies”). 
 99. Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1169 (describing controversy after 
Friendster introduced the ability for users to see which other users had viewed 
their profiles); McGeveran, supra note 15, at 1123–24 (recounting how some 
users had surprise Christmas gifts ruined when Facebook ads revealed pur-
chases to their recipients). 
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Whether or not a privacy lurch constitutes contract breach, 
it treats people unfairly, disrupting the goals of consumer pro-
tection.100 Privacy lurches can be unfair when they occur after a 
user has been coaxed into volunteering personal information 
based on promises of privacy that no longer apply.101 After a 
lurch, a service is no longer the thing the consumer thought he 
had agreed to buy; it is something much more harmful, possibly 
not worth the positive things the user enjoys in return. A priva-
cy lurch can also unfairly de-contextualize an individual, who 
might have produced different or additional information had he 
known the full extent to which his data was to be used.102
Within a liberal theory frame, abrupt change can work 
dignitary harms by “denying people control over the future use 
of their data, which can be used in ways that have significant 
effects on their lives.”
 
103 Moreover, as privacy lurches prolifer-
ate, we might be left unwilling to trust the status quo, which 
might lead us to self-censorship and disrupt our ability to de-
velop in ways we otherwise would.104
Even in Julie Cohen’s post-modernist view of privacy, in 
which change itself is not a bad thing, abrupt change is prob-
lematic.
 
105 “Vulnerability to environmental disruption” can 
sometimes inspire people to develop the “play of everyday prac-
tice” that she identifies as the central goal of good information 
policy.106
 
 100. I am using “unfair” here in the non-legal, colloquial way. Later, the 
article will take up the more precise meaning in the FTC Act. See infra Part 
III.C.3.  
 When ground rules change, people “are quick to ap-
 101. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 131 (“People 
might not give out data if they know about a potential secondary use, such as 
telemarketing, spam, or other forms of intrusive advertising.”). 
 102. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA 
BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 34 (1971) (“[A]n individual who is asked to provide a 
simple item of information for what he believes to be a single purpose may 
omit explanatory details that become crucial when his file is surveyed for un-
related purposes.”); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 132 
(“When data is removed from the original context in which it was collected, it 
can more readily be misunderstood.”).  
 103. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 132; Cohen, su-
pra note 13, at 1423–24. 
 104. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23–51 (1967); Cohen, 
supra note 13, at 1423–24. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTA-
TION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (discussing human behavior in social 
interactions). 
 105. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, 
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 56 (2012). 
 106. Id.  
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propriate unexpected juxtapositions of spaces and resources . . . 
toward their own particular ends.”107 Privacy thus should be 
about creating enough “breathing room” for people to engage in 
“socially situated processes of boundary management.”108
Still, Cohen is likely to criticize the kind of change de-
scribed in this Article not because change itself is bad, but be-
cause the change operates only in one direction, toward in-
creasing surveillance and away from privacy.
 
109 She finds 
privacy’s value in the way it creates fixed boundaries between 
people and society to enable each individual to engage in “dy-
namic, emergent subjectivity from informational and spatial 
constraint.”110 “[P]rivacy must balance a type of fixity against a 
type of mobility . . . .”111
Ultimately, exposing users to an ever-shifting landscape of 
broken promises of privacy, in which every privacy policy is in-
constant, whittles away expectations of privacy. I mean this in 
both the everyday and the legalistic meaning of the phrase. Ex-
pectations of privacy set our shared norms.
 
112 Constant privacy 
lurches create a “widespread individual ignorance” about the 
way information is used which in turn “hinders development 
through the privacy marketplace of appropriate norms about 
personal data use.”113 Scott McNealy’s quote that “You have ze-
ro privacy. Get over it,” becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy, as 
users are conditioned to assume that privacy is trending to-
ward zero online.114 If we allow this kind of corporate-driven 
norm redefinition to go unchecked, users-qua-citizens could be-
come a governing majority. We cannot create a system in which 
people live their lives without privacy and treat the ever-
increasing number of people whose lives are destroyed by pri-
vacy harms as the victims of forces outside their control.115
 
 107. Id. 
 
 108. Id. at 149. 
 109. See id. at 56; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyber-
space, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1682–83 (1999) (describing “one-sided bargains 
that benefit data processors”). 
 110. COHEN, supra note 105, at 149. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., con-
curring) (“Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular 
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in 
popular attitudes.”). 
 113. Schwartz, supra note 109, at 1683. 
 114. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 
1462 (2000). 
 115. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if the public 
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More legalistically, diminishing expectations of privacy 
might feed into constitutional law, because the Fourth 
Amendment is tied to the so-called “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” test.116 Prosecutors have cited the low-level of privacy 
provided in online service privacy policies as a reason they can 
order the release of copies of electronic mail117 or identify the 
location of cell phones118 without probable cause or a warrant.119 
Arguments like these will strengthen and multiply over time, 
as company practices push users to expect privacy in fewer sit-
uations.120
D. IT WILL GET WORSE 
 
By tracing the recent evolution of the market for online 
services we can confidently predict that privacy lurches will 
happen more frequently across more industries in larger steps. 
Many companies are actively reshaping their business models 
to try to profit from customer secrets, and by doing this, they 
find themselves in a large, diverse market, squaring off against 
competitors from what used to be non-competitive market seg-
ments.121 Thus, cable companies compete not only against their 
historical competitors for broadband, the telephone companies, 
but also against websites and search engines, credit card com-
panies, retailers (web-based and brick-and-mortar), streaming 
music websites, and e-book vendors.122
In earlier writing, I labeled this the “Google envy” effect.
 In a unified market for 
consumer behavior, anybody who knows somebody else’s se-
crets becomes a competitor.  
123
 
does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they 
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”). 
 
Google created an astronomical amount of value for its employ-
 116. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 117. See, e.g., Final Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 19, Warshak v. 
United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06–4092) 2007 WL 2085416, 
at *8, vacated on reh’g en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 118. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 20–21, In re Applications of the 
United States of America for Historical Cell-Site Data, No. 11-20884 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://epic.org/amicus/location/cell-phone 
-tracking/USA-Opening-Brief.pdf. 
 119. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1349–51 (2012). 
 120. See id. at 1348. 
 121. See Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1425. 
 122. Id. at 1425–26. 
 123. Id. at 1426. 
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ees and shareholders by turning user searches into nickels, 
through the magic of contextual advertising.124 Newly public 
companies like Facebook, which feels new shareholder pressure 
for profits, and broadband Internet providers are racing to do 
similar things in order to generate similar returns, they hope.125
These dynamic economic forces promise even more privacy 
lurches to come and spell disaster for privacy.
  
126 Facebook and 
ISPs pour energy for innovation into thinking of ways to collect 
and monetize more information without angering their custom-
ers or government regulators.127 Google feels the pressure of 
competition nipping at its heels, and collects more information 
just to stay ahead.128 Tens of thousands of other companies, in-
cluding many companies that never before thought of them-
selves as involved in the sale or purchase of information, now 
try to mimic the Google model.129 The evidence of all of this en-
ergy becomes manifest in the large, and slowly increasing, size 
of databases collected by companies large and small.130
II.  DEALING WITH PRIVACY LURCHES   
 For the 
end user, the consumer whose data has become the object for 
trade in this market, the result is unsettling: a market in which 
promises and expectations of privacy lurch like the unsteady 
deck of a ship caught in turbulent waters.  
We should find ways to protect users from the harmful, 
contract-breaching, dignity-impairing, psychologically jarring 
instability that occurs during privacy lurches. From the broad 
literature of information privacy scholarship that has emerged 
during the past decade, I will focus primarily on solutions fo-
cused on requiring transparent notice coupled with meaningful 
user choice. There are well-recognized problems with notice-
 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. at 1436–37.  
 127. See id. 
 128. Mat Honan, The Case Against Google, GIZMODO (Mar. 22, 2012, 12:19 
PM), http://gizmodo.com/5895010/the-case-against-google (describing dynamic 
economic forces pressuring Google to develop more privacy-invasive services). 
 129. See, e.g., Steve Hemsley, Data Collection Gets Innovative, MARKETING 
WEEK (Oct. 11, 2012), www.marketingweek.co.uk/strategies-and-tactics/data 
-collection-gets-innovative/4004088.article (describing a funeral home and an 
ice cream company that collect user data). 
 130. See Taylor Hatmaker, 5 Ways ‘Big Data’ Is Changing the World, EN-
TREPRENEUR (Oct. 7, 2012), www.entrepreneur.com/article/224582 (discussing 
the “huge stores of data” collected by companies, governments, and organiza-
tions). 
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and-choice solutions, described below. But by narrowing our fo-
cus to the special features that distinguish a privacy lurch from 
other privacy problems, we can overcome many of the short-
comings of past proposals.  
A. NOTICE-AND-CHOICE AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
1. General Principles 
The most common regulatory response to a privacy prob-
lem, especially in the United States, is reliance on notice-and-
choice.131 Notice-and-choice solutions depend on market forces 
to provide consumers with the amount of privacy that their 
preferences—revealed and express—suggest they truly desire, 
even when they claim to want more.132 The bedrock of these so-
lutions is the requirement that every consumer must be shown 
a detailed description of how information about him or her is 
collected, used, and shared.133 If this requirement is met, then 
any suggestion that we do more to protect privacy will be char-
acterized by the proponents of notice-and-choice as paternal-
istic, disrespectful of the free market, or catering to users who 
want to have their cake and eat it too.134
When regulators embrace notice-and-choice, they tend to 
relegate their responsibilities to monitoring the data-handling 
promises being made by companies, ensuring that users are be-
ing presented detailed descriptions of those promises, usually 
in the form of a detailed privacy policy, and trying to detect cir-
cumstances in which promises are broken for further investiga-
tion or action.
 
135 For most of the past decade, this describes the 
form of regulation that has been embraced by the FTC, which 
has identified notice as “[t]he most fundamental principle.”136
Even outside the United States, notice-and-choice play a 
disproportionately important regulatory role, although it is of-
 
 
 131. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7–9 
(June 1998), available at www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Calo, supra note 14, at 1049 (“Notice purports to respect the basic 
autonomy of the consumer or citizen by arming her with information and plac-
ing the ultimate decision in her hands.”). 
 135. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 131, at 40–41 (discussing the 
government’s “limited authority over the collection and dissemination of per-
sonal data collected online”). 
 136. See id. at 7.  
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ten supported by other substantive protections.137 In the Euro-
pean Union data protection directive, for example, two para-
mount Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) are “Pur-
pose Specification” and “Use Limitation,” which operate not 
unlike the way the FTC implements notice-and-choice.138
Ryan Calo explains why notice-and-choice-based privacy 
regulations are popular with many parties.
 
139 Regulators view 
them as “cheap to implement and easy to enforce.”140 They see 
them as unlikely to significantly impair innovation.141 Company 
representatives see notice-and-choice mandates as far less ob-
jectionable than the alternatives.142
2. Information-Quality Problems 
 
Despite the popularity and widespread adoption of notice-
and-choice rules for privacy, critics attack them unsparingly. 
Most of these critics focus on a broad list of information quality 
problems.143 Nobody reads privacy policies, and even if people 
did, they would not be likely to understand them, because they 
are often very long and full of legalese.144 There are also too 
many privacy policies, especially as so much economic and so-
cial activity moves to the web.145 Researchers at Carnegie 
Mellon estimated that it would cost the American economy 
hundreds of billions of dollars in lost worker productivity if eve-
ry worker decided to skim every privacy policy encountered.146
 
 137. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31, 34 [hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC] (discussing the require-
ment of an “explicit and legitimate” purpose for personal data processing). 
  
 138. Id.  
 139. Calo, supra note 14, at 1047–50. 
 140. Id. at 1048. 
 141. Id. at 1048–49. 
 142. See id. at 1050 (“Mandated notice can and does face opposition, but 
opposition tends to be less fierce than to top-down dictates regarding what a 
company can and cannot do.”). 
 143. See supra notes 13–14. 
 144. See Bianca Bosker, Facebook Privacy Policy Explained: It’s Longer 
than the Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2010, 12:24 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/12/facebook-privacy-policys_n_574389 
.html. 
 145. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687–89 (2011) (describing the “overload ef-
fect” in many contexts including online disclosure). 
 146. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Pri-
vacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544, 564 (2008). 
  
2013] BRANDING PRIVACY 931 
 
Even worse, humans suffer from bounded rationality and 
cognitive biases that conspire to make us likely to misunder-
stand privacy policies.147 Several surveys have found that many 
survey respondents believed that by publishing a document 
called a “privacy policy,” a company promised to protect priva-
cy, regardless of the content of the policy.148 Others have sug-
gested in studies that the ways companies frame privacy risks 
have a significant effect on acceptance, with the best strategy 
(from the point of view of the company) to state things in vague 
or uncertain ways.149 Consumers tend to trust the privacy prac-
tices of websites with a neat appearance and design, an exam-
ple of the representativeness heuristic.150 Other examples in-
clude the ways in which prospect theory, the endowment effect, 
and hyperbolic discounting can explain, in part, how people in-
correctly assess privacy risk.151
3. Traditional Notice-and-Choice During a Lurch 
 
It is critical to note how the problems with notice-and-
choice seem greatly exacerbated during a privacy lurch. When a 
user signs onto a new service for the first time, she at least re-
ceives cues from the unfamiliarity of the service that trigger a 
heightened attention to promises being made about information 
handling, if just a little.152 But after a user has settled into a 
service, she has little reason to continue to read changes to pri-
vacy policies.153
Consider the mechanics of notice-and-choice both during 
the initial launch of a company and after a privacy lurch. At 
the launch of a new service, several contextual clues mitigate 
some of the information-quality problems, yet these clues are 
absent during a lurch. For example, notice-and-choice during 
initial launch tends to follow a nearly invariant pattern: user 
 
 
 147. Calo, supra note 14, at 1052–55. 
 148. Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer 
Privacy in the Coming Decade, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 723, 730–32 
(2007–08). 
 149. See Acquisti, supra note 14, § 18.3.2, at 370. 
 150. Id. § 18.3.2, at 371.  
 151. Id. §§ 18.3.2, 18.3.3, at 371–72. 
 152. See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 146, at 559 (discussing that if us-
ers are going to read a privacy policy, they will do it on their first visit). 
 153. There are also problems with choice, separate from the notice prob-
lems discussed in the text. Many online services are offered without any sig-
nificant competition, meaning users are forced into take-it-or-leave-it situa-
tions. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 87, at 1180–82. 
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presses the “sign up” button; user provides some basic registra-
tion information; user is presented with the terms of service 
and privacy policy; user must click “I Agree” to continue.154 
Even though most users do not read the terms of service,155 and 
even though we should not want most users to do so,156
In contrast to this pervasive similarity, every lurch is dif-
ferent. Without the ceremony of the initial login, each company 
approaches notice-and-choice about change in different ways, 
and many companies treat their own different changes at dif-
ferent times in different ways. Some companies—probably the 
minority—prevent users from engaging with the service until 
they see the terms of service and click “I agree” once again.
 the 
highly evolved ceremony of notice-and-choice during initial 
launch gives users and their advocates a chance to notice the 
new service.  
157 
Most companies allow the user to engage the service without 
interruption, but send notices and alerts about the change. 
Google, for example, pervaded its pages with small, highlighted 
notices throughout February 2012, all of which included the 
pithy catchphrase “This Stuff Matters.”158 Some companies send 
out-of-band notices on blogs159 or anachronistically on paper let-
ters sent via snail mail.160
 
 154. See, e.g., Turow et al., supra note 
 
148, at 738 (discussing click-through 
privacy notices). 
 155. See id. at 740 (reporting the results of a survey finding that “only 1.4% 
reported reading EULAs [End User License Agreements] often and thorough-
ly, 66.2% admit to rarely reading or browsing the contents of EULAs, and 
7.7% indicated that they have not noticed these agreements in the past or 
have never read them”); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. 
Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Ap-
proach to Standard Form Contracts 1 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org. 
Research, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256 (reporting that “only one or two out of 
every thousand retail software shoppers chooses to access the license agree-
ment”). 
 156. See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 146, at 565 (calculating the cost 
of actually reading privacy policies as over 200 hours and $3500 per American 
Internet user). 
 157. See, e.g., Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or 
Online Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action 
Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 1–2 (2009) (discussing 
Sears’s acceptance requirement before consumers could install a tracking ap-
plication). 
 158. See Whitten, supra note 5. 
 159. See, e.g., id.; Mark Zuckerberg, An Open Letter from Facebook Founder 
Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 1, 2009, 8:23 PM), http://blog 
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Distressingly, companies often try to game information 
conditions during a lurch, to try to hide their true designs. 
Even when companies change practices in a way that signifi-
cantly reduces user privacy, they will often try to downplay the 
risk to privacy sometimes making specious claims about the 
benefits to the users of the change.161 And the vehicles used to 
provide notice-and-choice—privacy policies, press releases, blog 
posts, and snail mail letters—give companies the textual rich-
ness they need to engage in these misleading propaganda cam-
paigns. This has given rise to a new form of corporate writing 
that one might almost appreciate for its craftiness and subtlety, 
if the results were not deception and particular harm: privacy 
lurch doublespeak.162
For example, Google touted the benefits of its decision to 
tear down the walls between its databases as part of “efforts to 
integrate our different products more closely so that we can 
create a beautifully simple, intuitive user experience across 
Google.”
  
163 When Charter Communications decided to begin 
monitoring its users in partnership with NebuAd, its letter to 
consumers touted the improved ads each customer would soon 
see: “[T]he advertising you typically see online will better re-
flect the interests you express through your web-surfing activi-
ty. You will not see more ads - just ads that are more relevant 
to you.”164 And Mark Zuckerberg’s December 2009 blog post 
highlighted some privacy-friendly changes the company had 
made without hinting at the very anti-privacy changes made 
simultaneously.165
 
.facebook.com/blog.php?post=190423927130 (describing changes made to pri-
vacy policies). 
 
 160. See, e.g., Letter from Joe Stackhouse, Senior Vice President, Customer 
Operations, Charter Commc’ns, to Charter Customers (Apr. 29, 2008) [herein-
after Charter Letter], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/ 
pdf/technology/20080514_charter_letter.pdf . 
 161. See, e.g., Kevin Bankston, Facebook’s New Privacy Changes: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Dec. 
9, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-changes 
-good-bad-and-ugly. 
 162. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (de-
scribing a fictional totalitarian society controlled in part by government prop-
aganda). 
 163. Whitten, supra note 5. 
 164. Charter Letter, supra note 160; see Saul Hansell, Charter Will Moni-
tor Customers’ Web Surfing to Target Ads, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (May 14, 
2008, 8:40 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/charter-will-monitor 
-customers-web-surfing-to-target-ads/. 
 165. See Bankston, supra note 161; Zuckerberg, supra note 159. 
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B. IMPROVING NOTICE-AND-CHOICE DURING A LURCH 
Traditional notice-and-choice approaches are not nearly 
enough to address the special problem of a privacy lurch. The 
FTC has acknowledged this, calling for special rules during 
times of “material” privacy change.166
Many researchers have proposed ways to improve on text-
heavy privacy policies. Most of these proposals have turned to 
tables and symbols to try distill dozens of choices into more us-
er-friendly formats. Researchers have long talked about finding 
a “nutrition label” equivalent for privacy policies.
 Others have seized on 
this problem, albeit not in the context of lurches alone, and 
have proposed better forms of notice-and-choice. None of these 
proposals, however, does enough to take on the significant in-
formation-quality problems during a privacy lurch. 
167 Lorrie 
Cranor’s research group at Carnegie Mellon is a leader in this 
field, and has proposed several alternatives, heavy with sym-
bols and grids.168 FTC consultants have proposed standardized 
privacy notices for the financial industry.169 Many others have 
proposed different alternatives.170
But although each of these alternative designs is an im-
provement on text-based privacy policies, none seems to do a 
  
 
 166. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE 57–58 (2012) [hereinafter FTC FINAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 167. See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy 
Nutrition Label Filled with Fair Information Practices, 26 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (2009); Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A “Nutrition La-
bel” for Privacy, SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY (2009), available at 
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/proceedings/a4-kelley.pdf. 
 168. Robert W. Reeder et al., A User Study of the Expandable Grid Applied 
to P3P Privacy Policy Visualization, WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELEC-
TRONIC SOC’Y (2008), available at http://www.lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/ 
wpes24reeder.pdf. 
 169. See generally KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., INC., EVOLUTION OF A PRO-
TOTYPE FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICE (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
privacy/privacyinitiatives/ftcfinalreport060228.pdf. 
 170. See ALAN LEVY & MANOJ HASTAK, CONSUMER COMPREHENSION OF 
FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICES passim (2008), available at http://www 
.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/Levy-Hastak-Report.pdf (suggesting, in re-
port prepared for seven federal agencies, the use of tables in financial privacy 
disclosure); CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, MULTI-
LAYERED NOTICES EXPLAINED passim (2005), available at http://aimp 
.apec.org/Documents/2005/ECSG/DPM1/05_ecsg_dpm1_003.pdf (discussing 
various forms of privacy notices and suggesting a layered notice package ap-
proach); Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Pur-
chasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 INFO. SYS. RES. 254, 258–66 
(2010) (testing efficacy of privacy icons). 
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much better job than a privacy policy of being noticed and un-
derstood.171 None of the simplified labels seems simple enough. 
Studies have shown that many of them continue to confuse 
people.172 None has been widely embraced, despite endorse-
ments from important regulators.173 The authors of the new de-
signs themselves acknowledge continuing shortcomings and 
continue to search for something better.174
What has sunk every one of these efforts is the inherent 
complexity of the problem. These researchers have all started 
from the proposition that companies should be able to use in-
formation in any way they see fit, and accordingly, they have 
concluded that privacy notices must be plastic enough to accu-
rately represent every possible permutation of information-
handling practices.
 
175
The pressure toward complexity comes not only from a de-
sire to give companies the freedom to use information in every 
possible permutation; it comes from the other direction as well, 
from privacy watchdogs searching for tools that will lead to 
consumers making informed choices. Given the highly contex-
tual nature of privacy preferences,
 
176
These pressures that drive toward complexity seem always 
to outweigh countervailing desires for simple and easy-to-digest 
designs. Every one of the new designs summarized above con-
tains dozens of words and a blur of icons, colors, and grids.
 the more details we can 
provide consumers, the better informed they will be.  
177
Privacy, in other words, is not nutrition, according to the 
top minds who have considered the disclosure problem. With a 
nutrition label, people are interested most in calories, which is 
 
 
 171. See Calo, supra note 14, at 1033 (“Studies show only marginal im-
provement in consumer understanding where privacy policies get expressed as 
tables, icons, or labels, assuming the consumer even reads them.”). 
 172. LEVY & HASTAK, supra note 170, at 2; Patrick Gage Kelley et al., 
Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition Label Ap-
proach, CMU-CYLAB-90-014 (2010), available at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/ 
files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab09014.pdf. 
 173. FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 62. 
 174. See generally Aleecia M. McDonald et al., A Comparative Study of 
Online Privacy Policies and Formats, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH INTERNA-
TIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 37, 37–55 (Ian 
Goldberg & Mikhail J. Atallah eds., 2009) (finding that natural-language pri-
vacy policies are no more effective than their “jargon-laden” counterparts and 
offering observations for creating better privacy policy language). 
 175. See supra notes 167–71. 
 176. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 91, at 109. 
 177. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.  
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thus given a place of prominence on the top line. Those with 
more individualized needs—for example, those seeking a par-
ticular vitamin or mineral or engaged in a low-carbohydrate di-
et—will find some of the information they want further down 
the label. But despite catering to many needs, a nutrition label 
contains a mere fraction of the amount of information con-
tained in any of the “simplified” privacy labels presented 
above.178
Focusing on the privacy lurch offers a way out of the com-
plexity quagmire. In order to assess a lurch, we do not need to 
consider the entire infinitely rich set of ways companies can col-
lect, use, and share information. Instead, we can ask a simpler, 
more isolated question: how much has this company departed 
from its original privacy commitments? In some cases, the an-
swer to this question will be gloriously reducible to a single 
quantity: this company has doubled the number of people who 
can touch the information, or it has tripled the amount of time 
it retains the data. There of course will continue to be signifi-
cant variability in the way we measure and talk about privacy 
change, but the problem seems fundamentally simpler than the 
“anything and everything” problem tackled by the researchers 
described above. 
 
And the simplicity of describing the impact of a privacy 
lurch leads directly to new, better forms of notice that are much 
more compact and much easier to understand. One might imag-
ine a “green/yellow/red” light system summarizing how much a 
company has shifted away from its key privacy commitments.179
 Prior attempts to protect privacy during a lurch run head-
long into two significant problems: instability and information 
quality.
 
180
 
 178. See supra notes 
 The expectation-defying instability of a lurch gives 
rise to the harms discussed in Part I. The information-quality 
difficulties of the online environment explain why traditional 
notice-and-choice approaches do not do enough to protect priva-
cy. Luckily, there is an entire area of information-policy doc-
trine and theory—the study of trademarks and brands—that 
provides tools for both protecting consumer expectations from 
charges of instability and for improving information quality. 
168–70. 
 179. Much will turn, of course, on how we identify the “key” commitments, 
a question taken up in Part III.B.1. 
 180. See supra Part I.C. 
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C. LEVERAGING TRADEMARKS 
Critics of notice-and-choice decry the fundamental infor-
mation-quality problems associated with online privacy poli-
cies.181 Given the persistent frequency of these complaints, it is 
surprising that nobody has previously turned to trademark 
law, an area of law whose central focus has been the infor-
mation power of particular symbols in the consumer market-
place, for novel solutions.182
1. Trademarks,
 Trademarks can provide precisely 
what is needed to remedy the instability and information-
quality problems at the heart of the problems with privacy 
lurches. 
183
The law has recognized the commercial importance of 
marking goods and services since antiquity. From the first time 
a potter placed his distinctive mark on his wares, merchants 
have used words and symbols as information devices, efficient 
means to communicate to potential customers that the product 
or service has been backed by a known source who guarantees 
a specific level of quality and accountability.
 Brands, and the Law 
184 Today, govern-
ments provide legal support to bolster and protect the infor-
mation function of these words and symbols, through trade-
mark and other unfair competition laws.185
Trademark law extends protection to the first user of a dis-
tinctive mark in commerce.
 
186 For marks that are words (as op-
posed to symbols such as logos) distinctiveness is measured 
along a scale from generic to descriptive to “inherently distinc-
tive,” a category further subdivided into suggestive, arbitrary, 
and fanciful.187
 
 181. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 Inherently distinctive marks are protected upon 
 182. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 183. For most of the online services discussed in this Article, the relevant 
marks are service marks, not trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defin-
ing “trademark” and “service mark”). But to simplify the discussion, this Arti-
cle will use the word “trademark” throughout. 
 184. See generally FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925) (discussing the development of 
the law of trademarks). 
 185. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark 
Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987) (discussing the 
economics of trademarks and intellectual property law). 
 186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
 187. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
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first use,188 but descriptive marks cannot be protected until the 
consuming public associates “secondary meaning” with them, 
which is often demonstrated through the use of surveys.189 The 
Lanham Act, the federal trademark law, implements a national 
registration system, through which trademark owners can reg-
ister marks giving them a range of procedural advantages at 
trial and putting competitors on constructive nationwide no-
tice.190 A civil complaint for trademark infringement is an alle-
gation by a user of a mark that another is using a mark in a 
confusingly similar way.191 Prevailing parties are entitled to 
damages, fees, injunctions, and the destruction of infringing ar-
ticles.192
Trademarks implicate laws beyond trademark law when 
they are treated as communications from producers to consum-
ers.
 
193 By using a particular trademark, a producer makes 
claims about the qualities of his good or service. If these claims 
turn out to be false, laws that prohibit commercial deception—
most importantly false advertising law—might be triggered.194
2. The Information-Quality Power of a Name 
 
This Article does not argue that traditional trademark law 
and theory says much about the problem of the privacy lurch. 
In fact, traditional theory treats trademarks as nothing more 
than symbols of source alone.195
 
 188. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006) (permitting registration of a trade-
mark before use if registrant has bona fide intent to use). 
 During a privacy lurch, con-
 189. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 195 (1985). 
 190. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006). 
 191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck 
Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1118 (2006). 
 193. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Getting the Word Out: The Informational 
Function of Trademarks, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991, 1023–24 (2009) (explaining 
that trademarks serve to convey not only the source of sale or manufacture, 
but also information about the product itself).  
 194. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 14 (7th Cir. 
1992) (finding the use of mark “Ricelyte” to be false advertising under Lanham 
Act § 43(a)(2) because the product contained no rice ingredients). 
 195. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[T]he only 
legally relevant function of a trademark is to impart information as to the 
source or sponsorship of the product.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 
777, 788–89 (2003) (“Trademark law thus historically limited itself to prevent-
ing uses of marks that ‘defrauded the public’ by confusing people into believing 
that an infringer’s goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark hold-
er.”). 
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sumers are often misled about the nature and quality of the 
service they are using, but they are rarely confused about the 
identity of the company providing the service.196
We will return to trademark theory in Part III, but for 
now, I am making a descriptive claim about the words and 
symbols we call trademarks themselves rather than a broader 
claim about the theory of trademark law. Trademarks are con-
sidered worthy of legal protection because consumers tend to 
associate them with meaning, and this happens because 
trademarks are designed to be efficient delivery mechanisms 
for meaning.
 
197 To put it another way, trademarks are well-
engineered meaning machines. We can take advantage of this 
fact to use trademarks to impart notice during a privacy lurch. 
But although scholars and courts have often noted the way 
trademarks take on meaning, they rarely explain why these 
particular words and symbols, and not others, serve this func-
tion so well.198
First, trademarks act like meaning machines because of 
their inherent qualities, which in turn flow from the way the 
law defines a protectable trademark. Trademarks in any 
form—text, logos, slogans
 To support the claim that a trademark can do a 
better job communicating with consumers during a privacy 
lurch than traditional forms of notice-and-choice, we need to lift 
the hood on the meaning machine. Trademarks impart mean-
ing for reasons that can be divided into three categories: the 
inherent qualities of trademarks, the engineered attributes of 
trademarks, and the way trademarks tend to be used. 
199—tend to be simple and short. Most 
textual trademarks range from single words to short slogans; 
indeed, “the longer the slogan, the less probability that it func-
tions as a trademark.”200 Designs and symbols can also serve as 
trademarks,201
Because trademarks convey meaning in an efficient and 
compact form, they are much easier for a consumer to under-
stand than a typical privacy policy: dozens of pages, full of 
 but again, most trademarks tend to be simple, 
not ornate. 
 
 196. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 197. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 195, at 778.  
 198. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Com-
mon Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999) (“Trademarks are a compact and 
efficient means of communicating information to consumers.”). 
 199. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 200. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 7:20 (4th ed. 2012). 
 201. Id. § 7:24.  
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dense, incomprehensible legalese. Consumers can easily allo-
cate the time and attention to “read” a trademark, and almost 
no consumer will fail to notice when a trademark changes. 
The brevity of a trademark can counter the doublespeak 
problem too often encountered during a privacy lurch.202
The other inherent reason trademarks impart meaning is 
perhaps the most elemental: a trademark is a name. Trade-
marks are intertwined in complicated ways with a company’s 
identity.
 By let-
ting companies announce privacy promises using screens full of 
text alone, we invite evasion and confusion. If instead we could 
use the trademark as the principal channel for communicating 
important privacy changes to the consumer, we could constrain 
the harmful creativity of privacy counsel. 
203 Consumers collect impressions about their interac-
tions with a company over time, and they build those impres-
sions into a mental model linked directly to the name.204
Second, trademarks are meaning machines because they 
are engineered to be so. Companies do not select trademarks on 
a whim; instead, they employ experts in marketing and adver-
tising to engineer marks that exploit human psyche and cogni-
tion, burning particular meanings into memory.
 The 
name itself creates a mental placeholder for those impressions. 
205 For decades, 
researchers have explored the cognitive and psychological 
mechanisms that give trademarks their power to conjure posi-
tive brand associations.206 Marketing experts have developed 
strategies for building better, more memorable and meaningful 
trademarks: manipulating word structure,207 component mean-
ing,208 sound,209 color,210 typeface,211 and imagery.212
 
 202. See supra notes 
 
162–65 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Laura Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. 
L.J. 381 (2011) (explaining that a trademark has denotative, connotative, and 
associative functions as it relates to the company it stands for). 
 204. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trade-
mark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) (discussing con-
sumer impressions and cognitive bias). 
 205. See Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: 
Secondary Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADE-
MARK REP. 1013, 1023–24 (2001). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See Ira Schloss, Chickens and Pickles, Choosing a Brand Name, J. 
ADVERTISING RES., Dec. 1981, at 47. 
 208. See generally Kevin Lane Keller et al., The Effects of Brand Name 
Suggestiveness on Advertising Recall, 62 J. MARKETING 48 (1998) (examining 
the effects of brand name meaningfulness). 
 209. See generally Richard R. Klink, Creating Brand Names with Meaning: 
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Marketing professionals use these tactics and others to 
create brand symbols that are deeply imbued with meaning.213
The third set of reasons that trademarks act as meaning 
machines stems from the way trademarks are used by produc-
ers. Producers almost always display trademarks prominently. 
In fact, a buried symbol will probably not even earn protec-
tion.
 
The law does not grant trademark rights to arbitrary symbols. 
It is only when symbols are associated in the mind of the con-
sumer with particular meaning that the law applies.  
214 Often, a product’s trademark will be the largest element 
on its label.215 On the web, the principal service mark is almost 
always posted directly at the top of the page, well above the vir-
tual “fold” demarcated by the bottom of the browser screen.216 
Almost always, the logo or name is placed in the upper-left or 
middle-left of the web page, areas research indicates are the 
first a consumer views.217
Not only do producers display trademarks prominently, but 
also they use them consistently. At least with established 
brands, producers often change a name or logo only after great 
deliberation and study. In fact, the launch of a redesigned logo 
 
 
The Use of Sound Symbolism, 11 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (2000) (discussing the 
use of sound symbolism to create brand names). 
 210. See generally Channa Leichtling, How Color Affects Marketing, TUORO 
C. ACCT. & BUS. SOC’Y J., Spring 2002, at 22, available at http://www.touro 
.edu/tabs/journal02/tabsallc.pdf#page=22 (discussing the use of color in mar-
keting). 
 211. See generally Terry L. Childers & Jeffrey Jass, All Dressed up with 
Something to Say: Effects of Typeface Semantic Associations on Brand Percep-
tions and Consumer Memory, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 93 (2002) (examining 
the effects of typeface on consumers). 
 212. See generally Tushnet, supra note 204 (discussing consumers’ mental 
image of marks). 
 213. See Beebe, supra note 16, at 656–57. 
 214. Ex parte Procter & Gamble Co., 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 272 (Chief 
Examiner 1953) (noting that trademark law “clearly does not contemplate that 
the public will be required or expected to browse through a group of words or 
scan an entire page to decide that a particular word or words are intended to 
identify the product of applicant”). 
 215. See MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 7:3 (“[T]he prominence of a word or 
symbol is certainly an important element in determining whether it creates a 
separate commercial impression on the average buyer.”). 
 216. See Shaun Cronin, Designing for the New Fold: Web Design Post 
Monitorism, WEBDESIGN TUTS+ (Jan. 25, 2011), http://webdesign.tutsplus 
.com/articles/design-theory/designing-for-the-new-fold-web-design-post 
-monitorism/. 
 217. Jakob Nielsen, F-Shaped Pattern for Reading Web Content, USEIT 
(Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.useit.com/alertbox/reading_pattern.html. 
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is often a time of internal anxiety and external attention, as 
companies build marketing campaigns to tout new logos and 
the way they reflect their corporate values and qualities, while 
the web’s chattering classes debate each redesign.218
3. Trademarks as Symbols of Privacy Practices 
 
Orthodox trademark law tends to focus on only one partic-
ular type of meaning, the identity of the source of the product 
or service.219
Companies understand how naming can increase the visi-
bility of a privacy lurch. In 2010, Google launched Google Buzz, 
a platform for social networking layered atop Gmail,
 But because trademarks are meaning machines, 
consumers tend to associate them with many other meanings in 
addition to source. These additional meanings can include atti-
tudes about a company’s approach to privacy. Before turning, 
in the next Part, from the descriptive to the prescriptive, con-
sider one way privacy and branding tend already to be inter-
twined. 
220 but the 
company ill-advisedly decided to automatically enroll all Gmail 
users, and even revealed publicly each user’s most frequent 
Gmail correspondents.221 In 2007, Facebook launched Facebook 
Ads and Facebook Beacon, together a “social marketing” adver-
tising platform that caused users to become the unwitting so-
cial spokespeople for companies whose products they bought.222 
Both launches ended disastrously, as consumers first and then 
regulators next became concerned about the implications for 
privacy.223 In both cases, the FTC initiated actions against the 
companies, which resulted in sweeping consent agreements.224
 
 218. One blog describes its mission this way: “[Our] sole purpose is to 
chronicle and provide opinions on corporate and brand identity work, focusing 
mostly on identity design and a modest amount of packaging. We cover rede-
signs and new designs. Nothing more, nothing less, what you see is what you 
get.” Under Consideration, LLC, About Brand New, BRAND NEW, http://www 
.underconsideration.com/brandnew/about-brand-new.php (last visited Nov. 28, 
2012). 
 
 219. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 220. Edward Ho, Google Buzz in Gmail, OFFICIAL GMAIL BLOG (Feb. 9, 
2010), http://www.gmail.blogspot.com/2010/02/google-buzz-in-gmail.html. 
 221. Molly Wood, Google Buzz: Privacy Nightmare, CNET (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31322_3-10451428-256.html. 
 222. See Louise Story, Facebook Is Marketing Your Brand Preferences (With 
Your Permission), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at C5. 
 223. See Nicholas Carlson, WARNING: Google Buzz Has a Huge Privacy 
Flaw, BUS. INSIDER: SILICON ALLEY INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www 
.businessinsider.com/warning-google-buzz-has-a-huge-privacy-flaw-2010-2; see 
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Contrast Facebook Beacon with Facebook’s slow migration 
from private to public, and Google Buzz with Google’s decision 
to tear down the walls between its databases. In privacy circles, 
Buzz and Beacon are widely seen as disasters, deplorable deci-
sions that justifiably attracted regulatory scrutiny and ulti-
mately were driven out of existence. The other two decisions, 
while criticized, have not yet drawn the same kind of intense 
criticism, although it is still a bit too early to tell in the case of 
Google’s database decision. 
These side-by-side comparisons demonstrate the power of a 
name. We should not be surprised that branded shifts have 
generated more negative meaning in the minds of consumers 
than unbranded shifts made by the very same companies. A 
name casts a spotlight on an event in ways that focus the mind. 
Giving the service a name gives critics power over the thing 
named and the salience needed to support a messaging cam-
paign.225
III.  BRANDING PRIVACY   
 It is much more difficult to launch a campaign against 
a privacy lurch with no name.  
If we are worried about the disruptive and potentially 
harmful force of dramatic, expectation-defying privacy lurches, 
we should consider using the law to tie privacy promises to 
trademarks and brands, an approach I am calling “branded 
privacy.” Privacy law’s principal difficulty is with endemic in-
formation-quality problems surrounding meaningful notice 
online. Trademarks are designed precisely to focus consumer 
attention on a particular set of important meanings. 
The devil will be in the details, so this Part considers the 
details closely. Subpart A, after first presenting the proposal, 
connects theories of privacy and trademark and demonstrates 
how branded privacy can be well-supported by both. Next, sub-
 
also Steven Levy, Do Real Friends Share Ads?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2007, at 
30 (noting that more than 30,000 Facebook users joined the Facebook group 
“Facebook: Stop Invading my Privacy” in the first week). 
 224. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles Charges 
That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 
2011), http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm; Press Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, FTC Gives Final Approval to Settlement with Google Over 
Buzz Rollout, (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/buzz.shtm. 
 225. Compare the debate over the Carnivore FBI wiretapping technology: 
the technology still exists today, but now bears the much less menacing name 
DCS-1000, and it rarely gets mentioned in debates anymore. Orin Kerr, Inter-
net Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 607, 653–54 (2003). 
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parts B and C discuss the various shapes the proposal might 
take and how it might be implemented through common-law 
suits, the work of regulatory agencies, or new legislation. After 
presenting, in subpart D, examples of how branded privacy 
might work in action, the discussion concludes in subpart E, 
weighing the costs and benefits of the approach. 
A. TYING BRANDS TO PRIVACY PROMISES 
I call the proposal “branded privacy.” Policy makers should 
treat some of the data-handling decisions of almost every com-
pany as an immutable set of choices connected to the trade-
mark the company has chosen for its product or service.226 This 
connection should be set at the birth of the mark, and a compa-
ny that later decides to abandon a promise of privacy it has 
made to it is customers should be forced to choose a new mark. 
The underlying logic of the proposal is that by shifting away 
from a central privacy promise, the company essentially cre-
ates, from the vantage point of consumer privacy, an entirely 
new service, one that cannot justifiably be associated with the 
goodwill attached to the older mark.227
Although this prescription is novel—my research turned 
up no other proposal remotely similar to this one—it is not rad-
ical. It is well-supported by many theories that have been ad-
vanced by scholars of both information privacy and trademark 
law. Consider the teachings of each field in turn. 
 Google’s consolidated 
user database, Facebook’s default “visible to the Internet” set-
ting, and Charter Communication’s foray into behavioral ad-
vertising all represent business strategies that are different in 
kind—not simply in degree—from the business models they re-
placed. Users are entitled to be given clear, unambiguous notice 
of changes to privacy like these, but given the endemic infor-
mation-quality problems online, the only effective way to deliv-
er this is by leveraging the unique power of a trademark.  
 
 226. Once again, I am using the term “trademark” to refer to trademarks, 
service marks, and in some cases even to the more general term, “brand.” See 
supra note 183. 
 227. See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1201 (“[T]he initial design of the 
system is a representation to users that information they supply will be used 
in certain ways; by changing the service in a fundamental, privacy-breaching 
way, the site also breaches that implicit representation.”). 
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1. Branded Privacy and Privacy Law Theory 
Branded privacy sits comfortably within theories of infor-
mation privacy law in at least four ways. First, it pushes com-
panies to think deeply and consciously about their commit-
ments to information privacy in the early stages of their 
lifecycles. Second, this rationale echoes motivations for “Priva-
cy by Design,”228
a. Forcing Companies to Make Privacy Commitments 
 an influential new approach to privacy, but 
improves upon some of its shortcomings. Third, it continues the 
work of scholars trying to tie online privacy to consumer protec-
tion law by finding a way to create effective warning labels for 
the Internet. Fourth, it might nudge companies finally to com-
pete on privacy, a market whose absence many privacy scholars 
have long lamented. 
Branded privacy responds to the possibility that companies 
may embrace privacy lurches as intentional strategies by coax-
ing companies to commit themselves to fully specified and pub-
licly revealed promises about the way they handle information 
at the time they launch their services to the public.229
Branded privacy thus recognizes that it is difficult for a 
company to “bolt on” privacy after the fact. We should encour-
age laws, regulations, and enforcement practices that nudge 
companies to think about privacy at birth, by weighing the pros 
(innovative new features) against the cons (threats of privacy 
harm to users) of any design decision. Branded privacy will not 
dictate whether a company should choose the privacy-
enhancing or privacy-diminishing path, but it will bind them to 
their initial choices. 
 And once 
they make these commitments, they should feel strong regula-
tory pressure to stick with them. 
And after these choices are made, and companies announce 
them publicly—memorializing them, for example, in privacy 
policies—they will be treated like constitutional decisions, and 
they will stick. From that point forward, companies will be al-
lowed to make small tweaks to minor information-handling pol-
icies. But plaintiffs and regulators will be able to treat any 
 
 228. See generally PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://privacybydesign.ca/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 28, 2012). 
 229. I take for inspiration Tim Wu’s recent proposal for a “constitutional 
approach to the information economy.” TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 304 
(2010). Although the labels are similar, the concepts described are quite dis-
tinct. 
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choice to change a core privacy commitment as an act of recon-
stitution, which would require more in the way of public notice 
and government compliance. 
In order for branded privacy to work, companies must 
somehow be incentivized both to make concrete privacy com-
mitments and to give the public notice of those commitments. 
Otherwise, branded privacy might be gamed by companies that 
provide only muddled or vague promises of privacy, and like-
wise it will be defeated if companies delay making decisions 
about privacy issues. 
It may be that if some regulatory body publicly embraces 
branded privacy—for example, if the FTC announces it will 
seek to enforce branded privacy230
Regulators embracing branded privacy can augment this 
notice forcing effect through rules and legal presumptions. For 
example, the FTC might announce that it will read privacy pol-
icies that are ambiguously or incompletely drafted to provide 
the maximum amount of privacy, at least for these purposes. In 
essence, this will operate in the spirit of the contract rule that 
ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter.
—this alone will serve an im-
portant new notice-forcing function. Given the severity of the 
rebranding remedy, companies might feel added pressure to de-
clare their privacy commitments unambiguously and clearly at 
launch. Company executives will likely be terrified by the pro-
spect of losing a valuable brand, and the sheer possibility of 
such a fate might inspire them to make privacy commitments 
and to announce them loudly and unambiguously. At the very 
least, the remedy is likely to spur internal company delibera-
tions about core privacy commitments and whether they should 
be revealed. 
231
Finally, Congress or the FTC might couple branded privacy 
with a rule that mandates clear, public, and unambiguous 
commitments about important privacy decisions. Think of it as 
a mandatory product labeling law for the Internet. Congress 
has already required this kind of notice forcing in sectoral pri-
vacy laws such as HIPAA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and 
the FTC has required clarity in some of its settlement orders 
 In such cas-
es, later, clearer company announcements suggesting a less-
privacy-protective policy will be seen as the kind of shift that 
subjects a company to the branded-privacy remedy.  
 
 230. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). 
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resolving charges of unfair or deceptive trade practices.232
b. Giving Teeth to Privacy by Design 
 These 
might serve as models for a much more sweeping notice-forcing 
rule across industries, as a way to bolster a branded-privacy 
rule. 
Branded privacy will both support and improve upon a 
growing movement in regulatory circles for what is called Pri-
vacy by Design.233 Associated most closely with Ann Cavoukian, 
the Information and Privacy Commissioner for the Province of 
Ontario, Privacy by Design encourages companies to revamp 
their internal processes to better incorporate good privacy prac-
tices in initial design.234 Privacy by Design touts seven “founda-
tional principles,” including, for example, “privacy as the de-
fault setting” and “privacy embedded into design.”235
The first foundational principle of Privacy by Design is 
“proactive not reactive; preventative not remedial.”
 
236
[Privacy by Design (PbD)] anticipates and prevents privacy invasive 
events before they happen. PbD does not wait for privacy risks to ma-
terialize, nor does it offer remedies for resolving privacy infractions 
once they have occurred—it aims to prevent them from occurring. In 
short, Privacy by Design comes before-the-fact, not after.
 Commis-
sioner Cavoukian’s office elaborates this principle in the follow-
ing way: 
237
Privacy by Design, as currently elaborated, suffers from a 
few shortcomings that branded privacy can address. First, Pri-
vacy by Design focuses mostly on procedure and not substance. 
It says much about the need to revamp engineering design pro-
cesses in order to push privacy consciousnesses down into the 
job descriptions of the working engineers, but it says too little 
about what it means by good privacy design. Second, Privacy by 
Design relies mostly on voluntary implementation by compa-
nies, albeit sometimes with the participation of a regulator, 
 
 
 232. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, F.T.C. Approves Final 
Settlement with Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012), www.ftc.gov.opa/2012/08/facebook 
.shtm.  
 233. See Privacy by Design: From Policy to Practice, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2011/09/pbd-policy 
-practice-aug10.pdf.  
 234. See id. at 1. 
 235. Ann Cavoukian, The 7 Foundational Principles, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
(Aug. 2009), http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/ 
7foundationalprinciples.pdf (emphasis omitted). 
 236. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 237. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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perhaps through what some have called “regulation by raised 
eyebrow.”238 The problem is that even when privacy is baked in-
to a product or service, it can be unraveled easily, so Privacy by 
Design should do more to recognize the great temptations com-
panies feel to sacrifice user privacy for profits. Third, although 
Privacy by Design touts the importance of transparency, it re-
mains vague about how transparency should be implement-
ed.239
Branded privacy addresses every one of these shortcom-
ings, giving a firmer base for the idea. In any implementation 
of branded privacy, companies will need to commit themselves 
to specific core privacy decisions. Then, once selected, they will 
be obligated to publicly list the choices they have made, ad-
vancing Privacy by Design’s transparency principle. Most im-
portantly, faced with the risk of losing a valuable brand name, 
companies are much more likely to adhere to their initial choic-
es than under a purely voluntary regime. 
  
c. Better Notice: Warning Labels for the Internet 
James Grimmelmann notes the “natural affinity between 
the privacy law challenges facing Facebook and . . . product 
safety” law.240 Building on the work of others, he develops par-
allels between privacy and product safety, expanding familiar 
tort principles to online privacy problems.241
Most importantly, he wonders whether we might cure some 
of the problems with notice-and-choice by borrowing tort law’s 
encouragement of the use of warning labels.
 
242 “A good warning 
can point out hidden dangers to help a user avoid them or even 
make an informed decision to avoid the product entirely.”243
 
 238. Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 529, 559 (2009) (internal citations omitted). As an example of the way 
companies can work with regulators to implement Privacy by Design together, 
see Ann Cavoukian & Caroline Winn, Applying Privacy by Design Best Prac-
tices to SDG&E’s Smart Pricing Program, SDG&E (Mar. 2012), http://www 
.sdge.com/sites/default/files/documents/pbd-sdge_0.pdf, a paper about bringing 
the principle to the smart grid jointly authored by the Privacy Commissioner 
of Ontario and San Diego Gas and Electric. 
 
 239. See Cavoukian, supra note 235 (listing principle six: “visibility and 
transparency”). 
 240. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 813. 
 241. See id. at 814–17. 
 242. See id. at 821. 
 243. Id. 
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This seems especially important to alert users to unexpected 
change.244
Sudden, unanticipated, invisible changes to data handling 
practices bear more-than-passing resemblance to the kind of 
harms that we use product safety law to help prevent. Accord-
ing to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, a 
product that injures can subject a producer to liability “because 
of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warn-
ings.”
 
245
In product safety, warning labels must be placed in con-
spicuous places, likely to be seen just at the moment the risky 
behavior commences.
 
246
What is the power cord of a website? Often the risk to pri-
vacy stems directly from the use of a website itself, so the digi-
tal warning label should be posted somewhere conspicuous on 
the page itself. For this reason, California requires a link with 
the words “privacy policy” to appear somewhere on the first 
webpage visited.
 Brightly colored labels are often at-
tached directly to the power cord of a hair dryer or toaster, re-
minding the consumer about the risk of electrocution near wa-
ter. 
247 Courts construing online contracts have 
gone further, parsing a website into different parts, some more 
conspicuous than others. In Specht v. Netscape Communica-
tions Corp., the court refused to give effect to contract terms 
that were revealed only to consumers who knew to scroll down 
the page before clicking the agreement button.248 The FTC’s re-
port entitled Dot Com Disclosures provides similar advice.249
For some subcategories of online risk, such as the risks 
from behavioral, visual (as opposed to purely textual) advertis-
ing, the web does have a power-cord equivalent—the ad itself. 
In 2010, two advertising industry groups, the Interactive Ad-
vertising Bureau (IAB) and Network Advertising Initiative 
 
 
 244. See id. 
 245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998). 
 246. See Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 460 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1995) (“Failure to communicate an adequate warning involves such questions, 
as are here at issue, as to location and presentation of the warning.”). 
 247. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575, 22577 (West 2004). 
 248. See 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 249. FED. TRADE COMM'N, DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT 
ONLINE ADVERTISING 5–14 (2000) [hereinafter DOT COM DISCLOSURES], avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/bus41.pdf. 
  
950 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:907 
 
(NAI) voluntarily agreed to place explanatory icons directly on 
targeted ads to warn consumers about the targeting being 
used.250
But most other online interactions lack such an obvious lo-
cation to place an online warning label. Since no standardized 
warning label for the Internet has been embraced, companies 
devise their own methods of alerting consumers to change, of-
ten by posting open letters or blog posts to their customers full 
of the doublespeak described earlier.
 
251
On the Internet, the trademark itself (whether displayed 
as text in the browser’s title bar or designed into the conspicu-
ous logo pasted to the top of every page) sits perhaps on the on-
ly place where an effective warning label can appear. No other 
place on a website is as likely to be seen and noticed, particu-
larly given recent trends in technology away from desktop com-
puters and toward smart phones and tablet computers, which 
means that more users than ever view websites on small 
screens. With screen real estate at a premium, many websites 
produce scaled-back, mobile versions on which only the most 
essential information can appear.
 We can do better. We 
need to find warning labels for the Internet that are not so sus-
ceptible to doublespeak. We need to find a concise, compact 
form of information that alerts the consumer to the heightened 
risk to privacy, without engendering the kind of confusion and 
ambiguity so typically witnessed today. 
252 Large, conspicuous warn-
ing labels are not compatible with this medium.253
 
 250. See Press Release, Interactive Advertising Bureau, IAB and NAI Re-
lease Technical Specifications for Enhanced Notice to Consumers for Online 
Behavioral Advertising (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/ 
recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/pr-041410; cf. DOT 
COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 
 
249, at 1 (“In evaluating whether disclosures 
are likely to be clear and conspicuous in online ads, advertisers should consid-
er the placement of the disclosure in an ad and its proximity to the relevant 
claim.”). 
 251. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 252. See Andrea Matwyshyn, Resilience: Building Better Users and Fair 
Trade Practices in Information, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 391, 407 (2011) (“The task 
of reading multiple cross-referenced linked documents, potentially on a small 
mobile device, is limiting, at best. At worst, it is taking advantage of a crippled 
user interface.”); FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 63–64 (noting the 
“small space available for disclosures on mobile screens”). 
 253. See J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, Caution: This Superman Suit Will 
Not Enable You to Fly—Are Consumer Product Warning Labels out of Con-
trol?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 655–56 n.177 (2006) (describing the author’s hunt 
for an iPod warning about potential dangers to hearing). 
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d. Creating a Market for Privacy 
Once we implement branded privacy, we will force compa-
nies to make and publicize their privacy commitments and con-
nect those commitments to their brands. This, in turn, will like-
ly push companies to separate themselves into two camps 
enacting diametrically opposed strategies, perhaps leaving no 
companies sitting in between: Some companies will decide to 
compete aggressively on privacy and thus promise robust forms 
of privacy at launch. Other companies, deciding that robust 
privacy is not for them, will be driven to the other extreme, 
crafting privacy policies that leave open the possibility of any 
shift whatsoever for all time. Companies will be unlikely to 
strike out middle positions, offering some but not too much pri-
vacy, because they will lose the public relations benefits of 
choosing to be private but also lose the flexibility of choosing to 
be anti-private. Companies will know that such a position will 
leave them flanked by competitors on both sides with structural 
market advantages they will not enjoy.254
Some might complain about this result, arguing that the 
tendency for branded privacy to lead to two and only two dis-
tinct types of privacy actors meddles too much with a free mar-
ket. A rule that tends to push companies into a bimodal distri-
bution along the privacy axis will seem to sap the vitality and 
product differentiation that is so important in a healthy market 
and also so much a part of the history of the evolution of the In-
ternet. 
 
I see things differently, considering this aspect of branded 
privacy “a feature, not a bug.”255 Ever since legal scholars began 
taking up the issue of privacy on the Internet, they have be-
moaned the fact that individuals never seem to express their 
privacy preferences in the market.256 Many have complained 
that there is no market for privacy.257
 
 254. Game theoreticians might model the publication of privacy policies in 
pursuit of customers as a “signaling game.” See generally ERIC A. POSNER, 
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–27 (2000). The signaling game for privacy seems 
ordinarily to lead to a semi-pooled equilibrium, but branded privacy will push 
it to a separating equilibrium instead. See generally id. at 19, 25 (distinguish-
ing between semi-pooled and separating equilibriums). 
 I think part of the prob-
 255. Feature, THE JARGON FILE, http://www.jargon.net/jargonfile/f/feature 
.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012). 
 256. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: 
Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. 
L. REV. 743, 763–71 (2000) (explaining the failure of a market for privacy). 
 257. E.g., Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and 
  
952 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:907 
 
lem is the murky market for privacy online. Every website 
promises privacy yet few deliver. Privacy seems to be a market 
for lemons where promises are easy to make and quality is dif-
ficult to inspect.258
But things would change if firms began separating them-
selves into two separate piles. The full-privacy firms would say, 
“use us, we are private,” while the non-privacy firms would ar-
gue, “we might not be very private, but look at the services we 
offer!” If this happens often enough, consumers might learn to 
trust the content and stability of the different signals they are 
being sent, and a market for privacy just might emerge as a re-
sult. 
 As with all such markets, there seems to be 
little incentive to compete for privacy. 
2. Branded Privacy and Trademark and Brand Theory 
Branded privacy also finds support in certain aspects of 
trademark and brand theory. Although it might not seem to 
mesh well with orthodox, traditional trademark law and theo-
ry, when one digs more deeply, one finds a wealth of theories 
and scholars who provide support for the idea. In fact, one finds 
the very recent emergence of a new set of theories that run 
counter to orthodox trademark scholarship, and debates around 
branded privacy might help connect theories that until now 
have been disconnected. 
a. Traditional Trademark Theory and Source Identification 
According to traditional trademark theory, producers use 
trademarks to convey information about the source of a good or 
service. Indeed, many argue that source identification is the on-
ly form of communication protected under traditional trade-
mark law.259
 
Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. 
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 236 (2011) (“There is simply no functioning market for 
this kind of privacy.”). 
 These traditional theories are built almost entirely 
 258. See Joseph Bonneau & Soren Preibusch, The Privacy Jungle: On the 
Market for Data Protection in Social Networks, in ECONOMICS OF INFOR-
MATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 159–60 (Tyler Moore et al. eds., 2010) (“The 
market for privacy in social networks also fits the model of a lemons market 
well . . . .”); Tony Vila et al., Why We Can’t Be Bothered to Read Privacy Poli-
cies: Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market, in ECONOMICS OF IN-
FORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 143, 143–44 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen 
Lewis eds., 2004). See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: 
Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) 
(discussing the problem of lemons). 
 259. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
  
2013] BRANDING PRIVACY 953 
 
upon a law and economics theory about search costs.260 The law 
protects trademark users from confusingly similar uses by free-
riding competitors, because in so doing, it lowers consumer 
search costs, incentivizing and justifying investments in quality 
control, enhancing overall economic efficiency.261
Seen through the traditional law and economics lens, 
trademark theory provides little support for branded privacy. 
My claim is not that consumers become confused during a pri-
vacy lurch about the source of the service offered; instead, they 
misunderstand the qualities of the service they long ago signed 
up to use. In addition, traditional trademark theory and law fo-
cuses almost entirely on clashes between competitors—the par-
adigmatic trademark lawsuit involves a senior user and a late-
arriving junior user fighting over the collision of their two 
marks. Branded privacy focuses instead on a single company’s 
abrupt change, whether or not it clashes with the actions of 
competitors. 
 
b. Traditional Trademark Theory and Quality Control  
Although traditional trademark theory provides little sup-
port for branded privacy, well-established pockets of trademark 
law doctrine and scholarship directly support the idea that 
trademark law should prevent producers from disrupting con-
sumer expectations about the quality they come to expect from 
trademarked products and services. Admittedly, these pockets 
are sometimes viewed as outliers by scholars, rules that fit 
poorly within orthodox trademark theory. 
Trademark scholars and judges have long referred to the 
role trademarks play in guaranteeing consistent quality.262 The 
entire point of trademark law is that consumers will select a 
familiarly marked product over one bearing an unfamiliar 
mark, calculating that the marked product will promise a con-
sistent baseline of some quality they value, such as taste or du-
rability.263
 
 260. See Beebe, supra note 
 This idea has led to the formalized model of “good-
16, at 624 (“The influence of [the law and eco-
nomics justification for trademark] is now nearly total. It has been adopted at 
the highest levels of American law. No alternative account of trademark doc-
trine currently exists.”). 
 261. See Landes & Posner, supra note 185, at 269–70. 
 262. See, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 
(1985) (“[T]rademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of 
product quality . . . .”). 
 263. See MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 2:4 (“[T]rademarks create an incen-
tive to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods.”). 
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will,” the label given to the positive feelings consumers have for 
the products or services sold by a particular company or under 
a particular brand.264
To be clear, most scholars see quality assurance and good-
will as the end states or by-products of trademark law, not as 
essential qualities the law must bend to ensure.
 
265 The verb of-
ten used to describe the relationship between trademark law 
and quality control is “encourage”: “When it works well, trade-
mark law facilitates the workings of modern markets by per-
mitting producers to accurately communicate information 
about the quality of their products to buyers, thereby encourag-
ing them to invest in making quality products . . . .”266
In fact, experts are quick to point out that trademarks are 
protectable even attached to low-quality goods.
 Because 
certain uses by competitors of a mark are forbidden, consumers 
will begin to expect quality, and not the other way around.  
267 More often, 
however, the promise of enforceable trademarks and protecta-
ble goodwill encourages at least a modicum of quality control 
through what some have called the “self-enforcing” nature of 
trademarks.268 According to William Landes and Richard Pos-
ner, “[t]he benefits of trademarks in reducing consumer search 
costs require that the producer of a trademarked good maintain 
a consistent quality over time and across consumers. Hence 
trademark protection encourages expenditures on quality.”269 
The self-enforcing quality control mechanism no doubt plays a 
role in privacy, as companies like Google, Facebook, and Twit-
ter know that consumers associate their brands with particular 
types of privacy promises.270
 
 264. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of 
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (2006). 
 They also know how trademarks 
 265. Id. at 556 n.27 (“The point is not that trademark law provides affirma-
tive incentives to improve quality . . . . Trademark simply assures that when a 
firm creates a higher quality product . . . it is able to communicate that fact to 
consumers.”). 
 266. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 413, 414 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 267. MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 3:10 (“It is important to note that the 
quality function of marks does not mean that marks always signify “high” 
quality goods or services—merely that the quality level, whatever it is, will 
remain consistent and predictable among all goods or services supplied under 
the mark.”). 
 268. See Landes and Posner, supra note 185, at 270. 
 269. Id. at 269. 
 270. See MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 2:4 (“[G]oods of uniformly poor qual-
ity soon disappear from the market. A maker of a shoddy product can only fool 
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can punish a company stigmatized (fairly or not) with a reputa-
tion for poor privacy practices; they need only look to examples 
like Acxiom,271 NebuAd,272 or CarrierIQ273
This purist’s vision of trademark, which views consistent 
quality as a byproduct and not a value directly policed by 
trademark law, runs headlong into pockets of trademark doc-
trine it cannot explain. Several well-established rules penalize 
mark holders for failing to maintain particular levels of quality. 
A trademark can be lost through abandonment, which happens 
when a trademark owner ceases using the mark without intent 
to resume.
 for that.  
274 Assignment of a trademark “in gross,” meaning 
without the associated goodwill, can similarly lead to the loss of 
trademark rights.275 Licensors can lose trademark rights when 
they fail to supervise the quality control of licensees, sometimes 
called naked licensing.276 These rules push companies to work 
to maintain consumer associations between trademarks and 
the quality of their products to retain the benefit of the law.277
A related set of cases, which some call the “rebuilt product 
cases,” use trademark law to force consistent quality.
 
278 These 
cases ask whether a purchaser of a trademarked good can resell 
the product using the original brand, despite having made re-
pairs to it.279
 
some of the people some of the time.”). 
 In other words, when are repairs so fundamental 
to the quality of the resold product that it would cause confu-
 271. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, 
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKLEY BUS. 
L.J. 129, 196–203 (2005) (discussing Acxiom’s business model and security 
lapses); Natasha Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1 (pro-
filing Acxiom). 
 272. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 273. See Andy Greenberg, Phone ‘Rootkit’ Maker Carrier IQ May Have Vio-
lated Wiretap Law in Millions of Cases, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2011, 4:04 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/11/30/phone-rootkit-carrier 
-iq-may-have-violated-wiretap-law-in-millions-of-cases/. 
 274. Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 540 (4th 
Cir. 2000). 
 275. Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 276. Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 
595–96 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 277. Some scholars argue for the abolishment of quality control require-
ments like these. See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern 
Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 377–78 (2007) (arguing that 
changes to market structure threatens modern licensing practices, which, in 
turn, have become “fundamental pillar[s] of the economy”). 
 278. See Heymann, supra note 203, at 423–28. 
 279. See id. at 423. 
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sion to the consumer to allow it to be sold with the original 
brand? For example, when is a rebuilt luxury watch280 or a re-
conditioned spark plug281 so different in its qualities that the 
trademark holder deserves a remedy enjoining use of its mark? 
Laura Heymann synthesizes these cases into an “essential 
qualities” test.282 In some cases, a defendant might “alter[] the 
good’s essential qualities such that the trademark . . . can no 
longer be said to denote the same good.”283 These cases, al-
though sitting outside the central stream of trademark theory, 
have a long pedigree.284
Professor Heymann provides a useful vocabulary for dis-
tinguishing all of these rules from the traditional, source-
identification rules from which they depart, borrowing from 
linguistic and philosophical studies of naming.
 
285 Rules focused 
only on source identification recognize and enforce the denota-
tive function of naming.286 Names “provide a shorthand for an 
entity that can be used by others as a reference.”287 Other rules, 
like trademark abandonment, protect instead the connotative 
function of naming.288 Names “communicate, either directly or 
by suggestion, certain characteristics about a person or good, 
whether actual or aspirational.”289
The idea that trademark law recognizes the connotative 
function of trademarks and is connected to stability and con-
stancy suggests a conflict with the rise of the pivot and the pri-
vacy lurch. When a company uses a single symbol, logo, or 
name to refer to a music sharing site one day and a cloud stor-
age site the next, it might no longer deserve the full benefit of 
trademark law.  
  
This argument earns support once we consider the strate-
gic tendencies of modern companies. In the past, companies 
 
 280. See Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 281. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 126 (1947). 
 282. Heymann, supra note 203, at 425. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See id. at 423–28. 
 285. See id. at 391–93. 
 286. See id. at 393. 
 287. Id. at 392. 
 288. See id. 
 289. Id. Professor Heymann is not comfortable with rules in trademark law 
that seek to protect “nonessential changes” or “emotional connotations” in re-
branding. Id. at 386. But, she does not criticize rules focused on connotative 
meaning about essential changes. In Part III, I will argue that some privacy 
changes should qualify within this meaning of essential. 
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would sometimes vary trademarks in order to signal even sub-
tle changes to their consumers, rather than risk losing the 
goodwill they had so carefully built up.290 In 1985, a prominent 
and successful corporate giant made something like this pitch 
to consumers: this Coke tastes different, maybe for the better 
and maybe for the worse, not because our quality control 
measures have changed, but because it is actually “New Coke,” 
a different product altogether.291 We think it is better, and if 
you agree, we will probably drop the “New” signifier in a year 
or two, but for now, we are hedging our bets in case you disa-
gree and dislike the new offering.292 This turned out to be a 
wise calculation.293
Today’s companies seem to invert this strategy. Trade-
marks are used to obscure rather than highlight change.
 
294
c. The New Trademark 
 To-
day’s consumer “non-pitch” sounds more like this: this service 
is actually quite different from the service you originally signed 
up to use, and the changes mostly benefit us and might even 
harm you. But if we alerted you to this change, for example by 
adding “New” to our brand, we might lose you. By keeping the 
old name and old look and feel of the service, companies are 
trying to make potentially important changes seem unim-
portant and unworthy of scrutiny. This is trademark as 
smokescreen for change rather than as signifier of quality. This 
might stretch trademark law too far. 
It might be enough to build support for branded privacy 
upon a foundation of the quality control ideas sprinkled 
throughout trademark doctrine. If we combine the motivations 
behind the rules against assignment in gross and naked licens-
es with the logic of the rebuilt products cases and with the way 
economic theories of trademark tend to encourage stability and 
 
 290. E.g., Calboli, supra note 277, at 391 n.300 (discussing Coca-Cola’s ill-
fated and short-lived switch to “New Coke” brand). 
 291. See id.  
 292. Aaron Perzanowski provides another example. Starbucks has begun 
experimenting with “stealth stores” around Seattle through which they are 
experimenting with new business models. They are using different names—for 
example 15th Avenue Coffee & Tea—to perform the experiment. Aaron 
Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 14–15 (2010). 
 293. See Coke Lore: The Real Story of New Coke, COCA-COLA CO., http:// 
www.thecoca-colacompany.com/heritage/cokelore_newcoke.html (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2012) (describing the rise and eventual fall of New Coke). 
 294. See Heymann, supra note 203, at 423–28. 
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high quality, and if we tilt our head, just so, as we look at this 
Frankensteinian combination, we might see a satisfying theo-
retical basis for branded privacy. But this would be slightly dis-
ingenuous, as most of the strands of theory and doctrine recited 
in the previous Subpart are seen as aberrations, waiting to be 
pruned from trademark law by the shears of time.295
It is better instead to confess that branded privacy repre-
sents something new, an expansion of traditional thinking 
about brands and trademarks, a theory that sits outside 
trademark law’s traditional core, a theory about trademarks 
(and brands) but not exactly about trademark law. But alt-
hough this theory may be new, it finds many fellow travelers, 
direct support in the work of a number of scholars who have 
very recently—only in the past five years—begun to invert the 
focus of trademark theory: where most scholars see trademarks 
as weapons wielded by senior users against competitors to pro-
tect either the interests of consumers or their own intangible 
property, a new wave of scholarship casts trademarks instead 
as weapons to be wielded against the trademark holders them-
selves to protect consumer interests. To date, most of these 
scholars have failed to draw the connections between one an-
other, to recognize the way they have been launching what I 
will call “The New Trademark.”
 
296
Shahar Dillbary provides a cornerstone of the New Trade-
mark, with his work advocating “intra-brand” policing of 
trademarks, going beyond the “inter-brand” policing of tradi-
tional trademark infringement and dilution claims.
 
297 Dillbary’s 
work focuses on how trademarks can function as communica-
tive devices to mislead, deceive, or treat consumers unfairly.298 
He calls, for example, for an expanded use of false advertising 
laws to prevent companies from reformulating their marked 
goods and services.299
 
 295. See Calboli, supra note 
 Like other New Trademark theorists, 
Dillbary does not claim to be writing about trademark law at 
277, at 390–407 (making the case that the cur-
rent “quality control” requirements have failed and will be changed in the fu-
ture). 
 296. With apologies to Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New 
Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163 (2003), and Charles A. Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
 297. Dillbary, supra note 193, at 994–97; J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks 
as a Media for False Advertising, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 327, 328 (2009) [herein-
after Dillbary, False Advertising]. 
 298. Dillbary, False Advertising, supra note 297, at 328. 
 299. See id. at 364–65. 
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all; rather, he is calling for new private causes of action or the-
ories of agency enforcement that let us focus on the special 
harms associated with intra-brand abuses.300
Another New Trademark building block is Aaron 
Perzanowski’s article on “unbranding,” the name he uses to de-
scribe the act of intentionally abandoning a trademark after a 
quality control problem.
 
301 As examples he cites Comcast’s deci-
sion to rebrand its consumer-facing service to Xfinity to clean 
the slate on its poor consumer service reputation, ValueJet be-
coming AirTran after a tragic 1996 crash, and Philip Morris’s 
rebranding as Altria to ease the stigma the company felt from 
its history selling cigarettes.302 Perzanowski argues that the 
FTC can, and should, act to prevent deceptive examples of 
unbranding.303 A student note in the Harvard Law Review pro-
posed a similar solution, arguing that companies that accumu-
late negative associations with a mark, badwill, should be re-
quired to keep the mark for some time to avoid consumer 
confusion and harm.304
To broaden the New Trademark cohort beyond scholars 
trying to police intra-brand uses of trademarks, we can add 
others focused on brands more broadly. Deven Desai has criti-
cized traditional trademark approaches as “blinkered and con-
fused,”
 
305 missing “[t]he noncorporate dimension of branding 
[which] involves consumers and communities as stakeholders 
in brands.”306 Desai argues that the parallel corporate dimen-
sion to branding helps explain many of the last half century’s 
expansion of trademark law, but without embracing 
noncorporate interests, the “brand theory” of trademark is as-
yet incomplete.307
Under his brand-theory approach, Desai would have the 
law recognize the “shared value” approach to brand develop-
ment.
 
308
 
 300. See Dillbary, supra note 193, at 1026. 
 He connects this argument directly to work by other 
scholars in law and media studies chronicling the rise of 
 301. See Perzanowski, supra note 292, at 10–17. 
 302. Id. at 2, 11. 
 303. See id. at 45–46. 
 304. Note, supra note 17. 
 305. Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 981 
(2012). 
 306. Id. at 986. 
 307. See id. at 1036–37. 
 308. See id. at 1042. 
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antibranding or culture jamming.309 Desai implies that courts 
focused on brand theory should sometimes decline to enjoin us-
es of brands by consumers and communities in cases that 
would turn out the other way under traditional approaches.310
What joins the New Trademark scholars is a willingness to 
look beyond economic theories for support.
 
It is perhaps a small step to use Desai’s brand theory to sup-
port intrabrand enforcement of trademarks. We can shape the 
kind of healthy brand dialectic Desai desires by cabining the 
worst, most deceptive forms of brand redefinition. 
311 They build upon, 
for example, those theorists who have tried to tie trademark 
law to a liberal theory account of human autonomy312 or to free 
expression.313
By looking beyond the bare efficiency frame of law and 
economics, we can find further support for the branded privacy 
solution. For example, non-economic theories account better for 
arguments about power and control. We might begin to see re-
branding as a way to equalize power imbalances in society. 
This dovetails once again with Professor Heymann’s work on 
naming, as names are often intertwined with power.
  
314 In Gen-
esis, God gave Adam the power to name all of the animals.315 
Throughout history, governments and other powerful entities 
have used the power to name as a way to control another class 
of individuals, often including persecuted and oppressed classes 
of people.316
I am drawing a line around disparate scholars, some of 
whom might disagree with the prescriptions made by others in 
the group. In fact, some of these scholars might disagree with 
my branded privacy prescription, which in some ways goes fur-
ther than any of the others. The point is not that these scholars 
deserve to be unified as carriers of the same banner or practi-
  
 
 309. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2002); Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth 
Marketing and Antibranding: The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 
BUFF. L. REV. 795 (2010).  
 310. See Desai, supra note 305, at 1029–36. 
 311. Cf. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (arguing that the history of 
trademark law belies a close connection to economic efficiency rationales). 
 312. See generally Dillbary, supra note 193. 
 313. See Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A 
First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 667–97 (2009). 
 314. See Heymann, supra note 203, at 406–07. 
 315. Genesis 2:19 (King James). 
 316. Heymann, supra note 203, at 406, 406 n.98, 407. 
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tioners of a single theory; this is a looser coalition of scholar-
ship than that. What every one of these theories has in common 
is the idea that trademarks sometimes need to be treated as a 
two-way street. Because of the information qualities of these 
essential marketplace symbols, we need to police the way 
trademarks are used by the senior users, as much as we have 
policed uses by junior users. These theories seek to take back 
from trademark holders, in the name of preventing deception 
and other harm, a little of what trademark law has given away 
for centuries.317
3. Branded Remedies for Everything? 
 All of these theories, and branded privacy in-
cluded, begin to reimagine trademarks, at least a little, as lev-
ers to be pulled by litigants and policymakers to serve the goal 
of consumer protection. 
Some might wonder why rebranding should be limited 
merely to privacy policies. Should companies be forced to 
choose new brand names whenever they alter any important 
policies such as product safety, environmental practices, politi-
cal contributions, worker treatment, and relationships with to-
talitarian regimes? In some ways, this echoes Douglas Kysar’s 
rebuttal to what he calls the product/process distinction, the 
idea that consumers and regulators should legitimately focus 
only on information relating to a product (such as consumer 
safety or privacy) and not on information relating to the pro-
cesses that lead to the product (such as treatment of workers), 
an idea Kysar strongly opposes.318
I offer two responses: one pushing back mildly on Kysar’s 
argument, or at least arguing that it does not apply to this sit-
uation, but the second embracing Kysar’s point wholeheartedly. 
Pushing back, it is easier to justify tying a trademark to policy 
changes about privacy than it would be to other types of chang-
es. First, as demonstrated repeatedly throughout this article, 
the regulation of online privacy has centered entirely on notice-
and-choice, and this regulatory history is less well-developed in 
other areas. Second, the privacy policies of a company are tied 
much more directly than other “process-based” decisions of a 
 
 
 317. See Desai, supra note 305, at 1036 (arguing for a change to trademark 
law that “reorients and revives the role of trademarks as true information re-
sources, not simply one-way tools controlled by corporations”). 
 318. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product 
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 
530–31 (2004). 
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company. For an Internet service, levels of privacy often go to 
the essence of what the service offers. 
But, in truth, I do not think I have identified a unique bond 
between brand names and privacy policies. Instead, I am open 
to the idea that I have identified a new tool that can be placed 
in many different regulatory toolboxes beyond the privacy con-
text. Trademarks are supposed to symbolize stability and qual-
ity, and companies too often defeat that goal through strategic 
reinvention. When these fits of reinvention lead to significant 
risk of harm—as they do during a privacy lurch—it makes 
sense to consider putting rebranding remedies on the table.  
B. THE DETAILS 
Any solution to a privacy problem must compare costs and 
benefits. Before we can weigh the benefits of notice (and ulti-
mately privacy) of this solution against the costs of values like 
innovation, we need to spell out the variations on this idea that 
will define the pros and cons of the balance struck. There are at 
least four important variables to consider: (1) which privacy 
promises should trigger the requirement for a new brand; (2) 
whether or not companies should be allowed to migrate their 
users without consent to a new service, which corresponds to 
the traditional debate over opt-in and opt-out choice regimes; 
(3) what form the new brand should take and how much it 
must differ from the parent brand; and (4) how long the new 
brand should last. By varying these four properties, different 
regulators in different situations will be able to devise very dif-
ferent versions of branded privacy. For the most part, this Arti-
cle remains agnostic about these choices. Some permutations 
will give the regulation more teeth while others will provide a 
lighter touch, disrupting market forces less.  
1. Which Promises Should Be Bound? 
The first and likely most important decision a legislator or 
regulator needs to make about branded privacy is to identify 
the set of promises that trigger the obligation to shift to a new 
brand.319
 
 319. The FTC refers to this as the question of materiality. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 77 
(2010) [hereinafter FTC PRIVACY REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (seeking “comment on the types of changes 
companies make to their policies and practices and what types of changes they 
regard as material”); FTC, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 
 I have referred repeatedly so far to the “core set of 
11, 
  
2013] BRANDING PRIVACY 963 
 
privacy promises”320
Along the spectrum from long and overbroad to short and 
under-protective, we should be mindful of the novel and ag-
gressive nature of the prescription. Brands are important tools 
of consumer protection and markers of accumulated business 
goodwill, and we should be hesitant to disrupt them spuriously. 
At the same time, these same characteristics of brands explain 
why this tool promises such robust privacy protection. 
 that trigger the rebranding remedy when 
breached, but what belongs on that list? If the list of triggers is 
long or full of vaguely defined standards, critics will complain 
that the rule unduly burdens market forces. On the other hand, 
if the trigger list is too narrowly defined, the benefit to privacy 
will be slight. 
We must also keep in mind the twin goals of this proposal: 
improving the information environment around privacy choice 
and enhancing stability and predictability for consumers and 
companies alike. Both goals would be defeated if we linked a 
long and cluttered list of privacy promises to the rebranding 
treatment. “Sensible policy would focus on encouraging [com-
panies like] Facebook to make salient a few truly important 
facts about how it works, with good contextual help for the 
rest.”321
a. Characteristics for Appropriate Triggers 
  
The appropriate trigger list for the rebranding remedy of 
branded privacy will depend on the context, and individual 
regulators might promulgate multiple lists for different situa-
tions. Before considering specific candidate triggers, it will be 
helpful to survey the problem from a higher elevation, enumer-
ating the characteristics of a proper trigger.  
In describing these characteristics, I will refer repeatedly 
to the Fair Information Practice Principles, or FIPPs, which are 
lists of best practices for protecting information privacy prom-
ulgated by various government bodies and other organiza-
tions.322
 
at 41 n.73 and accompanying text (defining “material” and “material change”). 
 Every list includes some FIPPs that target privacy 
lurches directly. For example, most lists include principles of 
 320. See supra Part III.A; infra Part III.C.4. 
 321. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 821–22. 
 322. See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, 
BOBGELLMAN.COM 1 (Apr. 25, 2012), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg 
-FIPShistory.pdf. 
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“purpose specification” and “use limitation”323 and refer to 
breaches of these particular practices as impermissible “sec-
ondary use.”324 The EU Data Protection Directive prohibits sec-
ondary use without consent.325 Similar provisions are found in 
U.S. articulations of the FIPPs.326
Characteristic One: Predictable. Given the aggressive na-
ture of branded privacy, we should opt for predictability. In the 
jurisprudence literature on rules versus standards, many have 
concluded that rules provide ex ante certainty at the expense of 
some ex post fairness, which in turn is better advanced better 
by standards.
 These are a natural starting 
place, as scholars and regulators have debated these principles 
for more than forty years. Most widely-accepted examples of 
good privacy practices are included in some version of the 
FIPPs. 
327
Characteristic Two: Connected to Privacy Harm. Not every 
FIPP counteracts privacy harm directly. Some act more like 
due process rights in data that set the proper environment for 
privacy, acting indirectly and prophylatically. For example, a 
FIPP included on almost every list is the principle of security.
 In this case, we should tend to select rules, be-
cause certainty is paramount; companies should not lose their 
brands in response to decisions that they could not have antici-
pated ahead of time. In other words, the point of branded pri-
vacy is to change incentives, not punish misbehavior, and the 
rules should be designed with that goal in mind. 
328
 
 323. Id. at 4, 6, 9−11, 14−15. 
 
Companies that fail to provide adequate security leave custom-
er data susceptible to falling into the wrong hands through 
 324. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES 8 
(1998), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
 325. E.g., Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 137. 
 326. E.g., FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 319, at 77 (explaining that a 
company that decides to treat “consumer data in a materially different mat-
ter,” must first “provide prominent disclosures and obtain opt-in consent” or 
risk FTC action for unfair and deceptive trade practices); THE WHITE HOUSE, 
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRO-
TECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL 
ECONOMY (2012) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf (“If, subsequent 
to collection, companies decide to use or disclose personal data for purposes 
that are inconsistent with the context in which the data was disclosed, they 
must provide heightened measures of Transparency and Individual Choice.”). 
 327. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 
400–15 (1985). 
 328. Gellman, supra note 322, passim.  
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breach or hack. Although this is an important principle, it is too 
prophylactic to trigger branded privacy. 
In addition, a brand should not be lost simply because a 
company tweaks a minor privacy setting. Instead, brand link-
age should be made only for those privacy commitments we 
consider so essential, so fundamental to privacy, or so likely to 
raise significantly the risk of privacy harm that we include it 
on the list of choices that affix to a given brand. 
Characteristic Three: Measurable. One way to advance the 
goals of predictability and certainty is to choose triggers that 
are quantifiable and measureable. Many FIPPs can be reduced 
to rough metrics. For example, data minimization focuses on 
the amount of information stored and the length of time for 
which it is stored.329
A related quality for a good trigger is external 
observability. Some privacy practices are very hard to assess 
without invasive audits. Security is once again an example. 
Others, such as those that relate to how data flows with third 
parties outside a company, can sometimes be measured com-
pletely externally. For example, in online environments like the 
web and cell phones, third-party information often flows 
through third-party cookies, which can be observed by the con-
sumer herself, without any participation from the companies 
being studied.
 Use limitation (tied closely to purpose spec-
ification) can be tied to number of third parties with which the 
data is shared or spread within a single entity of the data. In 
both cases, we can test compliance simply by counting things. 
330
Characteristic Four: Consistent with Prevailing Regulatory 
Traditions. Finally, triggers should be consistent with the pre-
vailing regulatory traditions in a jurisdiction. This is less about 
ideal privacy policy and more an acknowledgement of political 
reality. Policymakers are much more likely to embrace branded 
privacy if they see it as strengthening legacy approaches rather 
than extending privacy policy into new areas. Thus, for exam-
ple, the FIPP of Individual Participation, which provides indi-
viduals the right to examine information stored about them 
and correct incorrect information,
 
331
 
 329. See Soghoian, supra note 
 is rarely implemented in 
3, at 209–15 (discussing data retention time 
limits). 
 330. See Julia Angwin, The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. 
J., July 30, 2010, at W1. 
 331. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Recommendations of the 
Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
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American privacy law.332
b. Which Triggers? 
 Given this history, it would probably 
be asking too much of American regulators to create new and 
somewhat foreign substantive rights while at the same time en-
forcing those rights in this aggressive new way. 
Taking these characteristics into account, three FIPPs 
seem best able to serve as triggers: Collection Limitation,333 
Purpose Specification, and Use Limitation. All three involve di-
rectly control the flow of information in ways that minimize di-
rect harm and find a long tradition of regulation in the United 
States in laws like HIPAA334 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley.335
All three lend themselves, at least imperfectly, to reduction 
to a metric. For example, according to the Use Limitation Prin-
ciple, as articulated by the OECD, “[p]ersonal data should not 
be disclosed, made available, or otherwise used for purposes 
other than those specified in accordance with [the Purpose 
Specification Principle]” without consent.
 
336
Other metrics can measure adherence to the Use Limita-
tion Principle in this rough way. Regulators might trigger 
brand reassignment any time a company dramatically increas-
 This translates 
roughly to the idea that flows of information should not expand 
significantly to new third parties. If a company shares infor-
mation with five third parties at the time a privacy promise is 
first made and at some future time expands to sharing with 
five hundred third parties (either suddenly or through a series 
of smaller shifts), this breaches the Use Limitation Principle. 
 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, O.E.C.D. DOC. C(80)58 Final (Sept. 23, 
1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422, 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines], 
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_34255_ 
1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html#recommendation. 
 332. The exception being the rights extended in the Privacy Act, which ap-
plies to “systems of records” held by the government. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
The Act provides individuals the right to review and request amendments to 
records about themselves. Id. 
 333. DHS’s FIPP of “Data Minimization,” which differs from Collection 
Limitation in some ways, belongs on this list as well. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., 2008-01, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM: THE FAIR INFOR-
MATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES: FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY POLICY AT THE DE-
PARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf. 
 334. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 335. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (enacted 
in 1999, codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
 336. OECD Guidelines, supra note 331, at 425. 
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es the number of people within a company who can access data, 
the number of databases to which a particular set of consumer 
data connects, or the length of time data is retained. This by no 
means exhausts the possible triggers for branded privacy, but 
the metrics discussed so far are likely to be included in most 
trigger lists. 
Finally, if a company’s new, post-lurch behavior would be 
prohibited by another privacy law, this too should trigger re-
branding. This should be so even if the conduct is technically 
legal under an exception for user consent, because branded pri-
vacy assumes that information-quality problems plague oppor-
tunities for meaningful consent without better forms of notice. 
For example, cable companies embracing NebuAd and Phorm 
may have violated the Federal Wiretap Act, despite that law’s 
exception for the conduct with consent.337 As another example, 
Netflix might have violated the Video Privacy Protection Act 
when it released records reflecting the movies its users had 
rated as part of the “Netflix prize.”338 In both cases, the compa-
nies relied on strained theories of consent.339
c. One Specific Trigger: The Choice Not to Advertise 
 But because both 
cases involved significant privacy lurches that fell within live 
prohibitions, regulators might have enforced branded privacy 
in either case.  
Given the organizing goal of predictability, it is probably 
not enough to recite the three FIPPs listed above, as the FIPPs 
are notoriously vague, jargon-laden, and subject to competing 
interpretations. The goal of a regulator promulgating a new 
rule of branded privacy should be to define triggers much more 
concretely and plainly. For example, rather than announcing 
the trigger of “Use Limitation,” a regulator should instead an-
nounce that one trigger measures the change in the number of 
people inside the company who can access the data. 
Another way to make the FIPPs much more concrete is to 
create triggers that are tied to commonly encountered scenarios 
or purposes. One example seems so commonly a part of the 
most worrisome privacy lurches that it deserves specific discus-
sion: a company’s decision to switch for the first time to a be-
havioral-advertising model. Companies that do not sell user in-
formation to advertisers at birth should not be allowed to sell 
 
 337. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1478–87. 
 338. Ohm, Broken Promises, supra note 88, at 1720–22. 
 339. Id.; Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1485–86.  
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user information for this purpose later unless they select a new 
brand. This is a fairly straightforward application of the FIPPs 
of Purpose Specification and Use Limitation but one given 
teeth by branded privacy. Consider a few examples. 
When cable broadband providers, like Charter Communi-
cations, partnered with NebuAd to begin selling ads based on 
customer web-surfing habits, they abandoned decades of past 
practice in favor of an egregious lurch toward advertising.340 
Given this dramatic and unprecedented shift, and especially 
given the sensitivity of the information Charter was positioned 
to watch,341
As another example, consider an even older group of in-
cumbents, the nation’s many electrical power companies. These 
companies have been building the so-called smart grid, inte-
grating information and communications technology into the 
legacy power grid, in order to reveal fine detail about energy 
usage in homes and businesses, through technologies like 
smart meters.
 this service should not have been permitted without 
a new brand. 
342 Proponents tout the way the smart grid will 
revolutionize grid operation, paving the way for significant new 
efficiencies.343 They also highlight how the fine-grained detail 
they are generating about energy usage in the home will lead to 
greater consumer awareness and, ultimately, assist conserva-
tion efforts.344
But the smart grid has also given rise to entirely new mar-
kets for entrepreneurs who imagine new applications that take 
advantage of all of this new data about consumer habits.
  
345
 
 340. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 
 It 
seems inevitable that one of these companies will someday soon 
propose selling advertising to consumers based on their home 
energy usage and patterns of usage, the smart-grid equivalent 
to NebuAd. Imagine an ad that says, “We noticed that you still 
6, at 1434–35. 
 341. Id. at 1434–35, 1444. 
 342. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2010 SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT passim 
(2012), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2010%20Smart%20Grid% 
20System%20Report.pdf. 
 343. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A 
POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY GRID: ENABLING OUR SECURE 
ENERGY FUTURE 25–36 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011.pdf. 
 344. Id. at 37–48. 
 345. Mark Chew, How to Drive Adoption of a Smart Grid Platform: A Look 
Inside Trilliant, MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP REV. (Sept. 6, 2011, 8:31 PM), 
http://miter.mit.edu/article/how-drive-adoption-smart-grid-platform-look 
-inside-trilliant. 
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watch TV on an old cathode-ray tube. Have you thought about 
upgrading to a flat panel?” When this happens, regulators (the 
state public utilities commissions) should consider this a signif-
icant, deeply worrying privacy lurch, and should consider regu-
lating it under a rule of branded privacy.346
This suggestion is consistent with the approach taken by 
the FTC in its 2012 privacy report.
 
347 In elaborating the types of 
“material retroactive changes to privacy representations” that 
would trigger a requirement of affirmative, express consent, 
the report gives one concrete example: “[A]t a minimum, shar-
ing consumer information with third parties after committing 
at the time of collection not to share the data would constitute a 
material change.”348
Regulators should look for recurring scenarios other than 
behavioral advertising that should qualify as branded privacy 
triggers. To give only two examples, branded privacy might be 
tied to decisions to shift private information and behavior to 
the public sphere (like Facebook) or to release privately held in-
formation to the public (like AOL in 2006
 This would cover the switch to behavioral 
advertising discussed above, although it is both broader and 
narrower. 
349
2. Migrating Users 
). 
Branded privacy can take on a weak or strong form, corre-
sponding roughly to opt-out and opt-in privacy regimes. In the 
weak form, companies must adopt a new brand name but can 
migrate all users from the old service to the new service, albeit 
only after giving notice of the move. The problem with the weak 
form is the problem with all opt-out regimes: defaults are 
sticky, and inaction trumps action, meaning users are likely to 
go along without complaint.350
In the strong form of branded privacy, a company cannot 
migrate users but instead must sign up users by requiring an 
affirmative action (maybe nothing more than the click of an “I 
 
 
 346. For more on the threat to privacy from the smart grid, see Elias Leake 
Quinn, Privacy and the New Energy Infrastructure 4–5 (Ctr. for Energy & 
Envtl. Sec., Working Paper No. 09-001, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1370731. 
 347. See FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 57–58. 
 348. Id. at 58. 
 349. Ohm, Broken Promises, supra note 88, at 1717–18. 
 350. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1256–69 (1998) (discussing “sticky” and “Teflon” default 
rules for cyberspace privacy). 
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agree” button) to switch. If a company wants to reinvent itself, 
it can, but only by starting from zero and building user trust in 
a new brand. 
Regulators should probably restrict use of the strong form 
to contexts where a strong intervention is necessary. Here 
again are principles rather than precise rules: first, lurches in-
volving sensitive information (such as relating to location, 
health, education, children, or communications) deserve the 
strong form. Second, lurches affecting industries with little-to-
no true competition should be treated with the strong form of 
the rule. Third, sectors that are already subject to privacy regu-
lation deserve strong treatment too. 
Some might argue that the weak form of branded privacy 
adds nothing to the regulatory toolkit because it is no different 
from legacy regulations that mandate notice and opt-out, which 
many decry as weak.351
Weak branded privacy is stronger than unadorned opt-out 
for at least two reasons, one focused on the inner-workings of 
the company and the other focused on the external visibility 
that branded privacy provides. First, companies are unlikely to 
rush into privacy lurches if it causes them to lose their brand, 
even if they can automatically migrate all of their users. 
Branded privacy will stimulate much deeper deliberation with-
in a company than opt-out rules can. In fact, companies that 
have invested a significant amount of time and money in their 
brand will possibly be more reluctant to move into weak brand-
ed privacy than even to an opt-in rule without brand conse-
quences. 
 This is a misguided response. Although 
the weak form of branded privacy bears resemblance to opt-out 
privacy rules, it is a far stronger form of regulation than opt-
out alone.  
Second, the weak form of branded privacy adds significant 
visibility to the public. Consumers are unlikely to miss the new 
logo greeting them not only the first time they log in after the 
switch, but for weeks or months afterwards, according to 
trademark theory.352
Regardless of whether branded privacy is selected in its 
strong or weak form, companies should be permitted to contin-
 In addition, privacy watchdogs and regu-
lators will find it easier to discuss the switch with one another 
and with consumers, given the convenient label.  
 
 351. See id. 
 352. See supra Parts II.C.1−2. 
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ue to use the old brand with users who are not subjected to the 
new rules. If Facebook wants to create a new service that is 
much more public than the original, it can create dual versions 
of the service, giving users the choice between switching to  
“Facebook World” or staying with “Facebook.” 
a. How Much Must the New Brand Differ? 
Any branded privacy solution must specify how much the 
new brand must differ to comply with the rule. But, once again, 
regulators should see fit to vary the answer contextually based 
on the seriousness of the privacy lurch problems they are trying 
to resolve. 
One possibility we should dismiss at the outset is trade-
mark law’s “likelihood of confusion” standard.353 In other words, 
we should not mandate that the new brand must differ so much 
from the old brand that consumers no longer will think that the 
services come from the same source.354
How different must two brands be to provide the sufficient 
amount of differentiation? The standard should be something 
like “likely to be noticed.” This will turn on the contextual 
norms, because names probably vary in different ways in dif-
ferent contexts and maybe even in single contexts over time.
 This would miss the 
point of branded privacy entirely. The idea of branded privacy 
is not that the consumer must think (incorrectly) that the new 
service is produced by a new producer. Rather, the goal is to 
ensure that the consumer recognizes that the new service is a 
new thing, from a privacy point of view, helping him try to 
overcome the information-quality problems he encounters in 
most online notice-and-choice situations. 
355 
It is likely that consumer surveys—similar to the ones uses to 
litigate likelihood of confusion356
 
 353. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 
1961). 
—will be useful, but these sur-
veys should ask different questions.  
 354. See id. at 495–96. 
 355. See id. at 495 (referencing the contextual variables that determine the 
sufficiency of differentiation including: “the strength of . . . [the author’s] 
make, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the 
products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confu-
sion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the 
quality of the defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers”).  
 356. See, e.g., id. (discussing differentiation evidence used to help establish 
likelihood of confusion). 
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Given the “likely to be noticed” standard, it seems that 
merely increasing a version number should not be enough, at 
least not without additional empirical proof that consumers pay 
attention to version numbers. Version numbers are rarely used, 
at least in any visible way, on the online services focused on 
most in this Article. Even in the analogous space of software, 
version numbers seem to mean less today than they once did, 
due in part to rampant version number inflation.357
Allowing version numbers for branded privacy might also 
invite gaming. If companies can increment version numbers at 
will whenever they want (to mark some minor change or per-
haps with no change whatsoever), they might do so strategical-
ly when branded privacy is not in play, to muddy the salience of 
any particular increment. They might train the consumer, in 
other words, to disregard version increments,
  
358
Regardless of the precise formulation, the rule should 
probably allow companies to use their prior marks as a compo-
nent of the new brand. In other words, companies should be al-
lowed to build what trademark law calls a “family of marks.”
 meaning the 
information-quality benefits of the rule will be lost.  
359 
Brands are extremely valuable things to many companies, par-
ticularly those associated with online services.360 For many 
companies, the brand may be the most valuable item on the 
books.361
 
 357. Frederic Lardinois, Browser Version Numbers Are Now Irrelevant—
And That’s a Good Thing, SILICONFILTER (Aug. 15, 2011), http://siliconfilter 
.com/browser-version-numbers-are-now-irrelevant-and-thats-a-good-thing/ 
(“[T]here is no good reason why an average user should have to worry about 
keeping a browser up to date and given the current version number inflation, 
these numbers have completely lost their meaning anyway.”). 
 Allowing the new brand to be based on the old one 
lessens the burden of branded privacy. This moderates the im-
pact on the market, which likely makes the rule more political-
ly palatable. 
 358. See id. (“There really isn’t any good reason why your average main-
stream user should have to worry about which browser version is installed on 
a given machine.”). 
 359. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 23:61 (discussing the “family of marks 
rule”). The treatise gives as a well-known family of marks the marks begin-
ning with “Mc” owned by McDonald’s Corp. Id.  
 360. See Tim Culpan, Apple Brand Value at $153 Billion Overtakes Google 
for Top Spot, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-05-09/apple-brand-value-at-153-billion-overtakes-google-for-top-
spot.html (stating Apple’s brand value at $153.3 billion and Google’s brand 
value at $111.5 billion). 
 361. See id. 
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Companies facing the branded-privacy rule will probably 
opt to add a word to its primary brand, think New Coke, Face-
book Beacon, or Google Buzz. Ideally, the meaning of the word 
or words appended will reflect in some way the change that has 
been made, such as “Facebook World” (for a more public version 
of the social network service) or “Personal Comcast” (for behav-
ioral-advertising-supported broadband). Whether this is re-
quired depends on the goals of the regulator and is not a neces-
sary component of branded privacy. But deceptive marks 
should never be allowed, meaning we should never see a 
“Google Private” as a rebrand to describe a new, more invasive 
service.362
b. How Long Should the New Brand Last? 
 
The final variable regulators or legislators might vary is 
the length of time the company should be required to use the 
new brand. We might achieve our policy goals without forcing a 
permanent shift. Companies might be given a time period, say 
one or two years, during which the new brand must be used 
(perhaps in conjunction with the old brand). At the end of the 
period, the rule might be lifted and the old brand restored.363
Sometimes, given the well-documented power of secondary 
meaning and goodwill accumulation,
 
The theory is that the negative effect of a privacy lurch fades 
with time. Privacy lurches disrupt through surprise and by un-
settling expectations. After one or two years after a privacy 
lurch, users—both new and continuing—will have had time to 
adjust to the new rules and privacy watchdogs and regulators 
will have had time to have their say. 
364
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
 companies might forego 
the chance to return to an old name. The company might decide 
that “Facebook Plus” ends up accumulating so much goodwill 
that it essentially abandons the bare Facebook name. 
Branded privacy can be implemented in law in at least 
three different ways. First, competitors or aggrieved parties 
 
 362. Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 11:54 (discussing “deceptive and de-
ceptively misdescriptive marks”). 
 363. Cf. Note, supra note 17, at 1862–63 (suggesting that firms seeking to 
change a product’s brand name to escape an accumulated negative reputa-
tion—or badwill—be given a period of time during which they must continue 
to use the old name). 
 364. See Landes & Posner, supra note 185, at 270. 
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might argue in trademark litigation that a company abandoned 
its mark when it shifted its privacy policies, although this theo-
ry is likely to be rejected. Second, the FTC might argue that 
dramatic shifts in a company’s core privacy commitments rep-
resent an unfair and deceptive trade practice unless carried 
under a new name. Third, Congress or state governments can 
consider enacting new consumer protection or trademark laws 
to implement branded privacy. 
1. Certification Marks Are Not Enough 
Some might argue that branded privacy unnecessarily du-
plicates the role of certification marks. The Lanham Act and 
many state trademark laws allow the protection of marks that 
“certify” some quality of an underlying good or service, with 
some certifying authority taking on the responsibility of polic-
ing quality.365 For privacy, several organizations have intro-
duced privacy certification authorities, most notably TRUSTe 
and BBBOnline.366 Without delving too deeply into ongoing de-
bates about the efficacy and importance of self-regulatory pri-
vacy efforts,367 it is enough to say that certification marks do 
not have a exemplary track record. TRUSTe, by far the most 
prominent of the efforts, switched from a non-profit to a for-
profit model in 2008,368 and today collects hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars from some of its certified entities,369
More to the point, neither TRUSTe nor BBBOnline extend 
the kind of sweeping scrutiny of changes made to privacy poli-
cies proposed in this Article. And, most fundamentally, a certi-
fication logo buried at the bottom of a smartphone screen is a 
 which 
casts a shadow on its claims of impartiality.  
 
 365. See 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006) (permitting registration of collective and 
certification marks); id. § 1127 (defining collective and certification marks). 
 366. See Xinguang Sheng & Lorrie Faith Cranor, An Evaluation of the Ef-
fect of U.S. Financial Privacy Legislation Through the Analysis of Privacy Pol-
icies, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 943, 948–50 (2006). 
 367. See generally, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online 
Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
439 (2011) (discussing the debate over how to protect personal privacy on the 
Internet); Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Be-
yond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 355 (2011) (same).  
 368. Saul Hansell, Will the Profit Motive Undermine Trust in Truste?, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS BLOG (July 15, 2008, 12:15 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2008/07/15/will-profit-motive-undermine-trust-in-truste/. 
 369. Claire Cain Miller, A Badge That Tells Customers, ‘Trust This App’, 
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Sept. 27, 2010, 4:55 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/09/27/a-badge-that-tells-consumers-trust-this-app/. 
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far less powerful symbol of privacy policy details than a re-
branded logo sitting in a place of prominence. 
2. Trademark Abandonment 
According to McCarthy,  
[s]ince a trademark is not only a symbol of origin, but a symbol of a 
certain type of goods or services and their level of quality, a sudden 
and substantial change in the nature or quality of the goods sold un-
der a mark may so change the nature of the thing symbolized that the 
mark becomes fraudulent and/or that the original rights are aban-
doned.370
Plaintiffs might try to rely on this kind of reasoning to con-
vince courts to implement branded privacy in trademark litiga-
tion. Civil litigants might claim, for example, that Facebook 
abandoned its mark when it switched from being a private to a 
public service. This theory faces several significant, and proba-
bly insurmountable, hurdles. 
  
First, this form of abandonment has rarely been found. The 
McCarthy treatise cites only one example, a 1910 case in which 
the manufacturer of SOLAR alum baking powder forfeited 
trademark rights by selling the mark to another who substitut-
ed phosphate for alum.371 Courts are unlikely to apply this rule 
in privacy lurch cases, perhaps by holding that a shift in priva-
cy, although important, constitutes a minor variation, not a 
wholesale change.372
Second, extending the law of trademark abandonment so 
aggressively seems to contradict fundamental trademark theo-
ry. Most importantly, the search costs theory holds that con-
sumers will police the qualities of a trademarked product or 
service that matter.
 
373
consider what happens when a brand’s quality is inconsistent. Be-
cause consumers will learn that the trademark does not enable them 
to relate their past to future consumption experiences, the branded 
product will be like a good without a trademark. The trademark will 
not lower search costs, so consumers will be unwilling to pay more for 
the branded than for the unbranded good. As a result, the firm will 
 According to Landes and Posner, 
 
 370. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 17:24. 
 371. Id. (citing Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448 
(C.C.D.N.J. 1910)). 
 372. See, e.g., Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 
571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Trademark owners are permitted to make 
small changes to their products without abandoning their marks.”). 
 373. Landes & Posner, supra note 185, at 270. 
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not earn a sufficient return on its trademark promotional expendi-
tures to justify making them.374
The negative implication of this reasoning is this: after 
companies change aspects of their service repeatedly and over a 
long time, and enough customers vote with their dollars by re-
maining with the service for the company to justify its invest-
ment in its brand, then the quality of the service being changed 
(privacy) is not one that matters to customers for some reason. 
 
There are, of course, responses to this economic argument. 
Customers would care, if only companies did not hide their pri-
vacy policies behind opaque user interfaces and complex legal-
ese. Or the values of privacy are such that they trump bare 
economic efficiency. But whether or not these arguments have 
merit in the abstract, they run up against the underpinnings of 
trademark law, which are built firmly on an economic efficiency 
rationale.375
Perhaps most devastatingly, the branded-privacy-by-
trademark-litigation theory runs aground on the unfavorable 
mechanics of trademark litigation.
 
376 Courts have held that 
consumers do not have standing to sue under the Lanham 
Act.377 Instead, the consumer protection goals of trademark law 
are advanced through competitors using similar marks, the on-
ly parties given standing to accuse a company of infringing a 
trademark.378 In most privacy-lurch situations, no such compet-
itor will exist. For similar reasons, administrative filings at the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to oppose registra-
tion or to request cancellation of a mark are also unlikely to be 
a useful vehicle for branded privacy.379
 
 374. Id. 
 Perhaps litigants could 
try to manufacture a case by copying the trademark or trade 
dress of a company that has abandoned its privacy commit-
 375. But see supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text (summarizing arti-
cles arguing for other theoretical justifications for trademark law). 
 376. Perzanowski argues that trademark law is not a useful vehicle for pro-
tecting consumers from harmful corporate “unbranding,” such as Blackwater’s 
decision to rebrand itself Xe, because of “structural limitations” of trademark 
law, namely the fact that “[c]onfusing uses of a firm’s own marks are largely 
unregulated by trademark doctrine.” Perzanowski, supra note 292, at 27. 
 377. E.g., Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. 
Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1173 (3d Cir. 1993); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn 
Mortg. Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1989); Colligan v. Activities 
Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692–93 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 378. Barrus, 55 F.3d at 470 (holding that litigants suing under the Lanham 
Act must allege either commercial or competitive injury). 
 379. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 200, §§ 20:7, 20:46. 
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ments, inviting a civil suit against itself. The copyist could try 
to assert branded privacy, then, as a defense to suit by the 
company. This is, of course, a risky strategy exposing the copy-
ist to liability.380
3. FTC Power to Police Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices  
 
The FTC might use its section five power to police “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices” to link a brand to a particular 
level of privacy.381 This might be the best way to implement 
branded privacy because it likely represents a new remedy for 
the FTC but not a new substantive rule. As summarized in the 
recent FTC privacy report, “[u]nder well-settled FTC case law 
and policy, companies must provide prominent disclosures and 
obtain opt-in consent before using consumer data in a material-
ly different manner than claimed when the data was collected, 
posted, or otherwise obtained.”382
Thus, in 2004, the FTC investigated alleged privacy viola-
tions by the owners of a website used to sell products sold un-
der the “Hooked on Phonics” brand name.
 
383 The complaint al-
leged that the company, Gateway Learning, made promises in 
privacy policies dating back to 2000 that it did “not sell, rent or 
loan any personally identifiable information regarding our con-
sumers with any third party unless we receive a customer’s ex-
plicit consent.”384 Contravening this promise, the company be-
gan “renting” personal information, “including first and last 
name, address, phone number, and purchase history,” without 
first obtaining consent.385 The company settled the case with 
the FTC after entering into a consent agreement that required 
opt-in consent for sharing data with third parties.386
Of even closer applicability, in 2011, the FTC accused Fa-
cebook of “deceiv[ing] consumers by telling them they could 
keep their information on Facebook private, and then repeated-
ly allowing it to be shared and made public.”
 
387
 
 380. Congress might consider introducing a new defense for trademark in-
fringement along these lines. 
 Among the 
many charges filed in the complaint, the FTC specifically fault-
 381. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 382. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 319, at 77 (footnote omitted). 
 383. In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443 (2004). 
 384. Id. at 445 (quoting Gateway Learning’s 2001 Privacy Policy). 
 385. Id. at 446. 
 386. Id. at 469. 
 387. FTC Press Release, supra note 86. 
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ed Facebook because, “[i]n December 2009, Facebook changed 
its website so certain information that users may have desig-
nated as private—such as their Friends List—was made public. 
They didn’t warn users that this change was coming, or get 
their approval in advance.”388
Although privacy watchdogs generally lauded the settle-
ment, some argued that it highlighted the somewhat toothless 
powers given to the agency.
 
389 The FTC lacks the ability to levy 
fines against companies for unfair and deceptive trade practic-
es.390 And sometimes the agency lacks will, not power. For ex-
ample, in the Facebook settlement, it declined to order Face-
book to roll back the “default public” settings it had thrust on 
millions of its users without their consent.391
The Facebook settlement would have been an excellent test 
case for branded privacy. Nothing seems to prohibit the FTC 
from treating a trademark itself as a component of a company’s 
disclosure, one that can later be part of a remedy for unfair or 
deceptive trade practices.
 
392
Finally, even if the FTC chooses not to so aggressively as-
sert power over a company’s trademarks, it might seek to ex-
tract changes to trademarks as an important condition in con-
sent agreements. 
 Going forward, companies should 
know that the agency is willing to treat violations in this way. 
Companies that cause significant, harmful privacy lurches like 
Facebook’s should pay the price with a new name. Perhaps 
even more importantly, the threat of branded privacy should 
play a notice-forcing rule, by convincing companies to elaborate 
their core privacy commitments clearly and unambiguously at 
their launch. 
4. New Legislation 
Although the FTC might be able to implement this change, 
in case there is doubt about the agency’s ability and willingness 
to do so, Congress and state legislatures might consider imple-
menting the change statutorily instead. Given the pre-existing 
 
 388. Id. 
 389. See, e.g., Grant Gross, Privacy Groups Generally Cheer FTC’s Face-
book Settlement, PCWORLD.COM (Nov. 29, 2011, 1:40 PM), http://www 
.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/245162/privacy_groups_generally_cheer_ft
cs_facebook_settlement.html (“The FTC’s settlement is as strong as the agency 
could achieve.”). 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. See Perzanowski, supra note 292, at 42–46. 
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dual federal-state framework for legislating trademarks and 
unfair competition, even a state legislature wields substantial 
power in this space.393
Congress might consider, for example, a new law that obli-
gates a company possessing information about users to associ-
ate its registered federal trademarks to a core set of privacy 
promises. The legislation could even specify a standardized 
format for this disclosure, bolstering the notice-forcing function 
of branded privacy. When changes are made to these core poli-
cies, the law should provide at least concrete FTC jurisdiction 
to order the use of a new trademark. If Congress wants to spur 
even more enforcement activity, it could offer individual ag-
grieved consumers a cause of action to pursue this remedy as 
well. It probably would not be wise to provide damages in these 
cases, but an injunctive remedy and the opportunity for cost 
and fee reimbursement would probably do much to bolster the 
effect of the law. 
 
In fact, Congress has been provided an excellent immediate 
opportunity for this change, as the White House has recently 
exhorted it to enact a new comprehensive baseline privacy law 
implementing its Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.394
Putting the prescription together, Congress could enact a 
new law modeled on the following: 
 
A) ENHANCED NOTICE OF MATERIAL CHANGES TO PRIVACY 
POLICIES. No entity possessing personal information about any in-
dividual shall make a material change to information-handling poli-
cies and procedures without giving notice to its users by assigning a 
new name to its affected products or services. 
(B) DEFINITION. As used in this Part— 
(1) “material change to information-handling policies” means any 
change that materially affects the risk of significant privacy harm to 
any individuals and should be further defined by the FTC as provided 
below. 
(C) FTC ENFORCEMENT. The Federal Trade Commission is em-
powered to enforce the provisions of this section and must promulgate 
regulations within eighteen months implementing this section. 
(D) PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT. Any person aggrieved by a material 
change to information-handling policies may bring civil suit to enforce 
this section with remedies limited to: 
  (1) an injunction ordering the use of a new trademark or service 
mark; 
 
 393. But see WHITE HOUSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 326, at 37–38 (calling 
for a new federal statute for consumer privacy that “preempt[s] State laws to 
the extent they are inconsistent” with it). 
 394. Id. at 35–36. 
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  (2) costs; and 
  (3) fees. 
D. EXAMPLES 
1. Revisiting the Three Examples 
Let us revisit the three privacy lurches from Part I to see 
how branded privacy might have been applied in response to 
each. The simplest example is the rise of NebuAd and Phorm.395 
These companies tried to supply broadband cable Internet ser-
vices with systems that would watch their user’s web-surfing 
habits in order to build profiles that could be sold to advertis-
ers.396 These new services represented a significant privacy 
lurch. In many cases, they would have cut against express 
promises made by the cable companies in prior privacy policies, 
which prompted some companies to send letters to affected cus-
tomers alerting them to the change.397
Under any form of branded privacy, broadband Internet 
companies would not be allowed to embrace NebuAd’s or 
Phorm’s new business models using their old brand names, 
even with user consent. Broadband companies have never mon-
itored users in this way or to this extent.
 
398 In fact, given the 
heavy regulation of the telecommunications industry, this ac-
tivity was probably already illegal without express consent. For 
one thing, the FCC’s so-called “CPNI” regulations399 might pro-
hibit it. And the federal Wiretap Act arguably makes it a felony 
for companies to engage in this kind of surveillance.400
A regime of branded privacy would not prevent companies 
like Charter from partnering with companies like NebuAd, but 
it would require Charter to launch such a service under a new 
name, say “Charter Personal” or “Tailored Charter.” Perhaps 
Charter would offer this to customers in competition with plain 
 
 
 395. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 396. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1433–35. 
 397. Hansell, supra note 164. 
 398. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1429–32 (explaining that provid-
ers did not have the technological capacity to conduct such a widespread moni-
toring scheme until recently). 
 399. Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommu-
nications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and 
Other Customer Information, IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927 (2007), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-22A1 
.pdf. 
 400. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1478–79; see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(1)(a) (2006). 
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ordinary “Charter” service, using price as a way to differentiate 
the products. 
This example suggests the need also for the “strong” form 
of the brand privacy solution, which requires not only a new 
name, but also prevents an automatic migration of users.401
In contrast, the two other examples involve companies that 
have not historically been subjected to much privacy regula-
tion: Facebook and Google. Would Facebook’s slow lurch from 
being strictly private to mostly public have triggered branded 
privacy?
 
This model demands opt-in, not opt-out treatment. Given the 
long track record of respectful privacy practices, the sensitivity 
of the information, and the history of close regulation, broad-
band providers should be required to convince customers to 
switch to their new, rebranded “Personal” versions rather than 
be permitted to migrate customers without consent. 
402 It is fair to say that Facebook is fundamentally a dif-
ferent service today than at the time of its launch in 2004, from 
a privacy point of view.403 This evolution can be traced contrac-
tually through the many versions of its privacy policy.404
Under the rules of branded privacy, Facebook would have 
needed to re-launch at some point as “Facebook World” or  
“Facebook Public,” albeit only for a limited time, perhaps a year 
or two. This fairly easy case raises two minor complications. 
First, because Facebook evolved slowly to its public state, regu-
lators might have found it difficult to isolate the precise mo-
ment when it needed to order the use of a new brand. This is 
far from being an exact science, however, and even if a regula-
tor cannot tell whether any particular single step taken by Fa-
cebook justified the requirement for a new name, it can be sure 
that when one compares the present form of Facebook with its 
2005 practices, the moment at which Facebook fell under the 
burden of branded privacy passed long ago. 
 
Second, Facebook should not have been able to avoid its 
rebranding fate by pointing to the fact that it provided privacy 
settings its users could toggle to use Facebook in a less-public 
way. Privacy settings are notoriously difficult to use, and re-
searchers have shown that users struggle with Facebook’s laby-
rinthine settings in particular.405
 
 401. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 Even though users can opt in-
 402. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 403. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 404. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 405. See, e.g., MICHELLE MADEJSKI ET AL., COLUMBIA UNIV. COMPUTER 
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to better privacy than the default, many will not, so the default 
setting is what regulators should assess.406
Finally, this brings us to Google’s March 2012 move tear-
ing down walls separating databases collected from different 
services.
 In this case, the new 
default setting would have triggered a new brand requirement.  
407
At least as far back as 2005, Google’s privacy policy ex-
plained that:  
 Even though this act represented a significant and 
undeniable privacy lurch, Google might not have been forced 
under the rules prescribed above to adopt a new name. This is 
because even though the March shift apparently shifted 
Google’s practices significantly, it may not have contravened 
any specific policies, shedding light on the muddled information 
quality of corporate pronouncements about privacy and starkly 
demonstrating why branded privacy must work hand-in-hand 
with new pressure for notice forcing. 
We may combine the information you submit under your account with 
information from other Google services or third parties in order to 
provide you with a better experience and to improve the quality of our 
services. For certain services, we may give you the opportunity to opt 
out of combining such information.408
But based upon the events of the past year, it appears that the 
company’s practices were out of sync with their policies.
  
409
 
SCI., TECHNICAL REPORT CUCS-010-11, THE FAILURE OF ONLINE SOCIAL 
NETWORK PRIVACY SETTINGS 11 (2011), available at https://mice.cs 
.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1459 (describing a study in 
which 93.8% of participants revealed some information on Facebook that they 
wished to keep private, while 84.6% hid information they wished to share). 
 Can 
a pattern of practice give rise to a privacy commitment that 
triggers branded privacy, even if express privacy policies allow 
different behaviors? In other words, can actions trump con-
tracts for purposes of this rule? 
 406. In Facebook’s case, some of the “default public” choices cannot be 
turned off even with privacy settings. Opsahl, supra note 73 (“Certain catego-
ries of information such as your name, profile photo, list of friends and pages 
you are a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks you belong to are 
considered publicly available to everyone, including Facebook-enhanced appli-
cations, and therefore do not have privacy settings.”). 
 407. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 408. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.google.com/ 
policies/privacy/archive/20051014/ (accessed through Google’s online archive of 
its previous privacy policies). 
 409. Although Google’s privacy policy technically may have allowed for this 
breaking down of walls between databases, the 2012 shift is the first time 
Google has done so. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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If a company explicitly and publicly promises—through 
marketing or comments to regulators—more privacy than the 
floor set in their contracts, this should give rise to a branded 
privacy commitment.410 Because branded privacy is about com-
mitments (and in the case of FTC enforcement, unfair and de-
ceptive trade practices411
But even with this gloss, the branded privacy case against 
Google is unclear. Although the 2005 privacy policy excerpted 
above alerts consumers to the possibility that data might be 
combined, we would need to review all of the “more than 70” 
privacy policies that also existed at the time.
) rather than binding contracts, it need 
not be limited to the words within the four corners of the con-
tract alone.  
412
It is thus unclear whether the FTC or a plaintiff lawsuit 
could have forced Google to rebrand due to the March 2012 
switch. This speaks once again to the need to couple branded 
privacy with some sort of notice-forcing mechanism, be it a new 
rule, a piece of legislation, or merely the incentive that comes 
from the stated intention by a regulator to enforce a powerful 
new rule.
 Did the con-
tracts for Google Docs and Google Calendar also provide the 
same notices? 
413
2. Examples of Branded Privacy from the Past 
 The fact that Google’s privacy commitments before 
this switch were shrouded in a mix of privacy policies, practic-
es, and public statements highlights why branded privacy plus 
notice-forcing rules are so needed. Once we implement branded 
privacy, companies that try to release confusing signals about 
their true designs will stand out from the crowd by their behav-
ior. 
If branded privacy had been the rule, a company like 
Google might have embraced the idea of selecting a new name 
voluntarily. Google could have declared that for one year, their 
newly combined services would bear a logo saying “New 
Google,” as part of a wide-ranging campaign for public notice. 
 
 410. Cf. Hartzog, supra note 10, at 1668–71 (urging courts to take into con-
sideration website design when interpreting online contracts).  
 411. Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Con-
tract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against 
Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2009) (noting that FTC section 
five actions turn not on contract principles but instead on whether acts are un-
fair and deceptive). 
 412. Whitten, supra note 5. 
 413. See supra Part II.B. 
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Doing this unilaterally would have signaled to both the public 
and regulators that the company intended to go well beyond 
what the law required in an effort to put every single customer 
on notice.  
Consider how often companies have relied voluntarily upon 
something like branded privacy in the past. Many companies 
have launched new, privacy-invasive services under distinct 
brand names, implicitly understanding the way a new brand 
can alert people to change. They have done this not because a 
law or regulator has asked them to do it, but because their own 
internal business incentives suggested they do so.  
When Facebook launched its controversial social marketing 
platform, it called it Beacon.414 When the company changed us-
er profiles to make it easier for users to access old data—and 
most notably old photos—of other users, it called the feature 
Timeline.415 In each case, the company implemented the new 
feature as an “opt-out” feature, meaning all users were forced 
to use it by default.416
Google has also embraced the branded privacy-like strate-
gy, for example, in launching “Buzz” and “Google Plus,” its two 
highest-profile forays into providing social networks.
 Whether this use of the weak form of 
branded privacy is sufficiently privacy-protective is not clear, 
but the fact that the company has associated so many new 
names with their service shows the power of the rule. 
417 Google 
also launched its email platform under an entirely new name, 
“Gmail.”418
 
 414. McGeveran, supra note 
 Gmail is a fascinating case study, because it shows 
how a new name can focus the mind of the consuming public 
about incipient privacy risks. And it also serves as a reminder 
15, at 1118–21. 
 415. Samuel W. Lessin, Tell Your Story with Timeline, FACEBOOK BLOG 
(Sept. 22, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.facebook.com/blog/blog.php?post= 
10150289612087131. 
 416. McGeveran, supra note 15, at 1119; Jill Duffy, 12 Things You Should 
Know About Facebook Timeline, PCMAG.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www 
.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2393464,00.asp. Timeline is opt-out only in a 
rough sense of the word. Users are forced to use it, but diligent users can mark 
old posts individually to cause them not to appear in their Timeline. Duffy, 
supra. 
 417. Introducing Google Buzz, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Feb. 9, 2010), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/introducing-google-buzz.html; Introduc-
ing the Google+ Project: Real-Life Sharing, Rethought for the Web, GOOGLE 
OFFICIAL BLOG (June 28, 2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ 
introducing-google-project-real-life.html. 
 418. Google Gets the Message, Launches Gmail, NEWS FROM GOOGLE (Apr. 
1, 2004), http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2004/04/google-gets-message-
launches-gmail.html. 
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of the limits of privacy law, because sometimes the consuming 
public, faced with truthful full disclosure about a service’s pri-
vacy choices, will nevertheless choose the bad option for priva-
cy, at which point there is often little left for privacy advocates 
and regulators to do. 
At the initial launch of Gmail, Google weathered a storm of 
fierce criticism because the service featured contextual adver-
tising.419 Ads appear alongside a user’s inbox, tailored to the 
content of the message being displayed.420 Privacy activists de-
cried the way Google seemed to be breaching the well-
developed norms of email, offering a service that complicated 
the previously bright lines between public and private.421 Some 
called for a boycott or a government investigation.422
But the storm of criticism did not stick. Users signed up for 
Gmail accounts by the millions,
 
423
Although some critics continue to point to Gmail as an ex-
ample of how ordinary consumers can sometimes fail to under-
stand the way new services risk individual privacy, I am not 
sure I agree. In the landscape of the privacy risks to which con-
sumers have been subjected, I am much less troubled by Gmail 
than I am by Google’s March 2012 database consolidation, in 
part because the new name and opt-in design of Gmail leaves 
me confident that most Gmail users joined the service at least 
aware of the privacy risks. 
 and criticisms of its contex-
tual advertising seem today to have faded. The lesson product 
designers should draw from Gmail is not that contextual adver-
tising of the inbox is not unusually violative of privacy. The 
better lesson is that you never have a second chance to make a 
first impression. Gmail set (mostly) transparent privacy rules 
from birth. Before its developers began enrolling the masses, 
they made it well-known that they were changing the status 
quo. 
 
 419. Chris Gaither, Google’s E-Mail Strategy Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 
2004, at C1. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Gmail Privacy FAQ, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/ 
privacy/gmail/faq.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012) (urging concerned users to 
change providers and discussing state legislative proposals). 
 423. Erick Schonfeld, Gmail Grew 43 Percent Last Year. AOL Mail and 
Hotmail Need to Start Worrying, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2009), http:// 
techcrunch.com/2009/01/14/gmail-grew-43-percent-last-year-aol-mail-and 
-hotmail-need-to-start-worrying/ (estimating Gmail having nearly thirty mil-
lion users). 
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E. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
1. The Costs 
Even if branded privacy would help cure the information 
quality problems that plague information privacy, do those 
benefits outweigh the costs? Some might object that they do 
not, by arguing that branded privacy unnecessarily intrudes on 
a free market. On the contrary, this solution seems much more 
deferential to the market than other proposals that have been 
advanced. For example, some proposals urge a much more 
sweeping reworking of contract law, one that might call into 
question minor or unimportant terms in privacy policies or 
even online contracts with consumers outside the privacy con-
text.424
This proposal is also more deferential to the market than 
proposals that would restrict or severely limit what holders of 
data are allowed to do with user information. Under branded 
privacy, services can be born non-private, and when they are, 
they can remain that way, assuming their creators exercise 
meaningful notice and consent and take steps to prevent harm-
ful downstream uses. Twitter, which unlike Facebook was born 
inherently public,
 My proposal instead restricts itself to a few unusually 
important forms of privacy promises, those worthy of being part 
of branded privacy’s trigger list, with no effect on promises that 
go beyond that list. 
425
Another market-focused objection might center on how the 
proposal might harm innovation by preventing start-up compa-
nies from experimenting with new privacy settings. This brings 
us back to where we started,
 can continue to use its brand without limit. 
426 to the dynamic benefits of piv-
ots.427
This is a serious objection, but one that can be easily ad-
dressed. Any implementation of the rule should include a “first 
milestone rule,” one that forestalls application of the rule until 
a predefined moment in the lifecycle of a service. The first mile-
stone might be a certain number of users, say 10,000.
  
428
 
 424. See Hartzog, supra note 
 Until a 
10, at 1670–71; Andrea M. Matwyshyn, 
Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529, 560–61 (2007). 
 425. See Skelton, supra note 77.  
 426. See supra Part I.A. 
 427. Wortham, supra note 26, at B1. 
 428. In the final draft of the FTC Privacy Report, released March 26, 2012, 
the Commission exempted any company collecting “non-sensitive data from 
fewer than 5,000 consumers a year” in order “to address concerns about undue 
burdens on small businesses.” FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at iv, 15. 
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service reaches 10,000, the terms of branded privacy are not yet 
set. Or the milestone might be defined with a less rigid stand-
ard such as the moment when the service goes beyond “friends 
and family” or when the service begins taking registrations 
from the general public. Other possibilities might tie the first 
milestone to venture capital funding, an IPO, or even the “al-
pha/beta/release” labels that websites already use. 
Another objection builds on themes raised in both of the 
first two: the proposed remedy might unfairly privilege start-up 
ventures over incumbent players. Because the rule is triggered 
by change to initial promises, only incumbent players are sad-
dled by its requirements, meaning the proposal disrupts the or-
dinarily evolution of a market. This objection is the easiest to 
rebut, for nothing in the proposal prevents an incumbent from 
entering into a market with a privacy-invasive business model. 
The rule simply requires the incumbent to give up its old brand 
(and maybe its old roster of users) in order to compete in the 
new space.  
In fact, the rule might produce the happy side-effect of in-
creasing competition. Incumbents will no longer be able to cre-
ate successful services based primarily on their favorable mar-
ket share and the inattentiveness of their customers. The rule 
will place a thumb on the side of the scale of the upstart new 
entrant, but not as a matter of competition policy. Instead, this 
approach reflects what economics, psychology and computer 
science suggest as a better way to overcome fundamental in-
formation-quality problems during times of change. The result-
ing framework triggers meaningful notice and consent and is 
thus likelier to lead to consumer privacy. And lest we feel too 
badly for incumbents, we should remember the many other 
structural advantages incumbents enjoy, from well-honed effi-
cient processes, to political power, to ready access to vast 
amounts of capital. From among a long list of benefits the in-
cumbent enjoys, we are removing only one: exclusive control 
over a brand. 
2. The Benefits 
Branded privacy will impose some costs on dynamic effi-
ciency; are the benefits worth it? Some might argue that they 
are not, as branded privacy suffers from the same problems 
that plague all notice-and-choice solutions. First, because 
branded privacy gives companies the option of selecting zero 
privacy, it does too little to protect users from predatory com-
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panies. To this, I must emphasize that branded privacy is 
meant as one solution targeting the special problem of the pri-
vacy lurch, but it is not meant to preempt other solutions fo-
cused on other contexts. Proposals to regulate much more ag-
gressively and thoroughly certain sectors that tend to traffic in 
highly sensitive information, for example, should be pursued 
and would be complementary, not contradictory, with rules 
mandating branded privacy. 
The branded privacy remedy is also less powerful if used 
too often, as users will become desensitized to this form of no-
tice-and-choice over time.429 I doubt that users are so easily de-
sensitized, even to frequent brand name changes, because 
trademark theory teaches us about the information-signaling 
power of a logo or trademark.430
  CONCLUSION   
 In addition, because mandated 
rebranding will occur only for significant privacy shifts, and 
given the amount of accumulated capital most companies hold 
in their brands, rebranding will probably be a very rare event, 
one that privacy advocates will be well-equipped to bring to the 
attention of consumers who might not notice the change them-
selves. The point of branded privacy is not to spawn a crazily 
shifting landscape with brand names of prominent services 
changing weekly. Instead, and perhaps somewhat ironically, 
branded privacy will probably result in stability, because it will 
force companies to engage in much more initial internal delib-
eration about what type of privacy strategy they want to em-
brace—enabling Privacy by Design—and it will force them to 
abandon deceptive bait-and-switch strategies that today seem 
far too appealing. 
Dynamism sometimes comes at a cost. Companies embrace 
new business models in order to keep up with competitors and 
a rapidly evolving technological landscape. But sometimes they 
do it riding on the backs of their customers, converting data-
bases full of personal information into profits, particularly by 
shifting to new advertising-based models. This disrupts the ex-
pectations of users and contradicts claims of meaningful notice-
and-choice. 
 
 429. See Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 812 (“Demanding explicit con-
sent every time information is shared with someone other than its specific, 
original audience could require hundreds of prompts, per user, per day.”). 
 430. See Beebe, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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This Article has presented an aggressive but still middle-
way proposal: tie a company’s initial privacy practices to its 
trademark. Better than a ban on sudden shifts, this remedy 
leaves freedom for corporate reinvention and also addresses the 
information-quality problems that have plagued earlier pro-
posals based on notice. Better than a do-nothing embrace of 
market deference, it envisions an active and important role for 
government regulators, and it has the teeth necessary to check 
some of the natural excesses the market ordinarily incentivizes. 
The benefits are many: companies will think more about 
privacy at the outset, choose business models that sacrifice user 
privacy more deliberatively and at an earlier stage, announce 
their decisions publicly and unambiguously, and think twice 
before breaking their promises. Consumers will learn to rely 
more on company promises, notice significant changes much 
more frequently, and less often find themselves baited by a 
good service planning for the day it will become bad. Finally, 
privacy advocates and government regulators will have a pow-
erful new tool in their arsenal to combat a commonly recurring 
and important information privacy problem. 
